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PREFACE

the purpose of this monograph is to review critically
the position taken hy the United States Navy on the problems
of military unification and strategy that faced the Nation
between the end of World War II in 1945 and the Korean
Incident of 1950.
In work on this stWy, the imual tools of academic
research have been considerably tempered, modified, and sup
plemented by personal experience and observation.

These

additional aids, acquired during fourteen years of service in
the arsed forces, included duty with agencies of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 1946 and 1947, a time of crisis at this
focal point for interservice controversy over proposals for
unification and strategy.

In addition, experience with the

military budget at the Engineer Research and Development
Laboratories and at Fifth Army Headquarters from 1946 to
1950 provided an intimate knowledge of many source materials
and events related to this subject that are still concealed
from public view because of administrative or security re
strictions.
The reader alone can judge whether this familiarity,
beyond the public record of post-World War II military
policy, has unduly influenced or preconditioned the opinions
-ill-
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and eonclusions expressed here.

To some this account will

undoubtedly appear highly personalized, brutally frank, and
arbitrarily narrow in its selection and evaluation of signif
icant evidence.

In partial extenuation for any departure

from the restraints imposed by scholarly tradition/, a later
historical verdict may reveal with more abundant clarity the
present necessity for a harshly critical examination and pre
cise diagnosis of the factors essential to continued national
and individual survival.

Perhaps the contemporary record presented now, with
its shallow hindsight supported by more valid historical les
sons, may even make this apology of an uncertain prescience
unnecessary.

Such at least was the naive hope permeating

this work, which, unfortunately, is not apologetic, but tact
less to an extreme.

Tact, however, is not necessarily a

virtue, if in matters of life and death it leads to a danger
ous form of self-deception.

Address instead of tact may

sometimes be demanded and is tried here in the sincere belief
that skill and adroitness in the management of American mili
tary affairs are perhaps more appropriate to reality, even
political reality, than approaching these problems from the
point of view of what is merely fit, graceful, considerate,

or expedient.
EDWARD 0. COOK

Missoula, Montana
August, 1952
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CHAPTER I
YARDSTICK FOR RATAL YARDARM

. # . the dem»eratle purpose does not prosper
when a man dies or a building oollapses or an enemy

foree retreats. It may be hard for it to prosper
unless these things happen, and in that lies the
entire jastifioation for the use of fcorce at all
as a weapon of national policy. . . ..-Ambassador
George F, Kennan.1
Among the aliments of total power forged by the Unit

ed States in the post-World War 11 period, military power
has received more recopiition than in the past as a neces
sary factor for continuing national strength.

Particular

mmphasis has been given military power in the narrow sensearmed force immediately usable to supplement other instru
ments of policy in projecting the national interest on the
world scene.

Between the end of World War IX in 1945 and

the Korean incident in 1950, this s#plem»ntal instrument of
policy, ready a%^d force, was subjected to searching and

continuing examination by Congress, which displayed unusual
interest and vigor, for a postwar period, in determining the
organisational, material, and strategic means of the military
available to the United States.
iQeorge F. Kennan, jafr|cas D,MQata,cZ
Hereafter cited as Kennan.
-1-
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Re#d for a y&rAatlok. The purpose of this study is
to review critioally the position taken by the United Btat#e

Havy on the problems of military unification and strategy
that were facing the armed forces and the Ration during this
time.

First, however, some relevant factors correlating the

environment, necessity, and role for force in the present
world will be noted as a required framework for necessary

reference in evaluating particular aspects of force, such as
the one being studied.

The grisly implications of these fac

tors concerning physical coercion as an instrument of policy
apply to the Western world as a whole, as well as to the
tfnited States, and must be understood unless specific secur
ity problems within the West are to be appraised without
criteria in a meaningless vacuum.

Certainly, this understand*

ing is required in considering the problems presented by tdie
Wavy*8 position on defense between 1945 and 1950.

As part

of the scaffold needed to view more clearly this naval atti
tude, there looms large the basic cause for amphasis by the
United States on military power in being during the post

war Id

War II period.
The narrowing choice. In large measure, this reac

tion to power realities facing the United States is due to
the significant narrowing of diplomatic and military choices
imposed on the Western world, recognised by Kennan^ as the
Zgennan, 3, 57, 74-75, 78-79, 93.

-3-

eutatanélag International development of the past fifty
yeara*

At long laat, even the Baited Statea, the strongeat

bulwark of the Weat, haa aoknowledged that the gap of allow
able error in aolving the problème related to aeourity la
eloaing to a dangeroi» degree in a polarising world*

Wo

longer ean past advantages of apaee, time, and power diffu
sion save **. . * those who hitherto had been half blind. . ,*3
from the perijj^la of grossly ignoring any vital element of
power required in the real world of today.

This world unfor

tunately bears little relationship to a juristical nirvana
where national armed forces have been multilaterally discard
ed as a needless supplement to rule by law enforced by inter
national police power.

Realistically, the Baited States has

chosen since 1945 to maintain ready aimed forces on a scale
previously wi#iout parallel in American history except at
the peak of physical conflict in the first two world wars.
Even these forces of the world wars shrink when compared to
forces augmented by the significant multiplier of atomic
power in the post-1945 period. Sharp as well as latent tools
of military power have become a necessary part of contempo

rary existence.
Criteria for coercion. Still to be determined is
whether these sharp tools will be used by the United States
with a surgeon** delicate skill only when the ills among
^Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (II,

the bo4i«a politic of the world are so severe that umasslmt-

ed treatment by other means fails to insure survival of the
West.

Although any other type of successful medication may

be preferable, the surgery of force in necessary aid to
otherwise failing medicine is better than certain destruc
tion from the poison of abject appeasement. Abhorrent though

this use of force may be, its intelligent application does
present some hopeful aspects even in a world rapidly growing
more capable of self-destruction.

First, adequate force may

by its own strength exclude the necessity for its active use
and passively allow more rational elements of policy to pre

vail in an irrational world.

Second, active employment of

force occasionally can make a great contribution, at least
temporarily as in the Korean incident, when:
. . . if used with forethought and circumspection
and restraint, it may trade the lesser violence for
the greater and impel the stream of human events
into channels which will be more hopeful ones than
it would otherwise have taken. . . .4
Lastly, in the holocaust of an Armageddon, force, dominant
as a tool of policy during the battle, may still, in nominal
victory, stalmate, or even defeat, impose conditions m»re
favorable to reason, moderation, and stability in the world
than voluntarily choosing bondage as a substitute for sacri
fice.
Less hopeful, but nevertheless real, is the dilemma,
equally perplexing to both East and West, of inadvertently
4g#nnan, #9.
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carrying force a# an instrument of policy to it# ultimate
possible peak of total bwman destruction.

Although a world

wide cloud of radioactive cobalt dust^ might provide the
maximum of stability in human affairs, it appears doubtful
that any state will intentionally create such a condition.

Fortunate, indeed, is the world that group action on a large
scale. Inspired by an inconceivable mass psychosis, is still
required to exterminate all life willfully.

However, with

extortion by intimidation, backed by progressively growing
increments of coercion and force, prevalent in the present
world, recognition must be given to the risk at any time of
being faced with the ultimate blackmail of destruction or
surrender.

Weapons capable of this threat against America

may soon be in place off the Pacific shore of the Halted

States, as Brown realistically anticipated.^

The only cer

tain means of meeting such a threat, wreover, lies not in
the dubious, yet desirable, attempt to induce a prior settle
ment obviating such a possibility, but in possessing and
advertising to the world recognisable meqns of instant re
taliation capable of carrying to any aggressor destruction
at least equal to that threatened.
Nevertheless, negotiation for peaceful settlement
guaranteeing coexistence should be pressed at every
^Harrison Brown, “How Big Heed a Bomb Be?"
American Scholar. XIX, Summer 1950, 269.
% b i d .. 269-270.

The
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opportunity with the utnost vigor of patient, skilled diplo
macy.

Backing this diplomacy must be the will and means to

counter successfully interspersed efforts at intimidation
and coercion adverse to vital interests of the West*

Timely

and judicious ultimata backed by force, like the Atlantic
Pact, may reduce the opportunities for these ventures into
intimidation and limited use of force that offer such tempt
ing delays for the Bast in arriving at a final decision and
choice between settlement and risking mass destruction.

Even

then, the temptation to test these ultimata will still be
present if doubt of the ultimate will of the West exists.
Restrained application of force for specific limited objec
tives may be attempted as a last resort in the hope that,
even if the ultiemta stand up and are enforced, unrestrained
use of atomic power will be limited fortuitously on both
sides, as in World War II with poison gas and biological
weapons.

The chance for survival of any life in such an

environment appears doubtful indeed.

Only the hopelessness

of the dilemma and total lack of pmfit to anyone in such a
tenuous lease on lifs* if abundantly recognised on all sides,
may force the millenium of profound peace with workable uni
versal safeguards.

Fortune or reason might prevail at an

early date, but the road to the last slim hope seems long
and tortuous, dependent as it is on the courage of the West
to face continuously the possibility of death for all in
preference to total surrender.

ymle##, however, the West has this stamina, any epti*
mism is fatmems that the eontinaeâ building of absolute and
intermediate weapons of power will oontribute to pemanant
world stability in which the West is a partner.

More likely,

wishful escape from the sacrifices of reality will prevent
even the maintenance of sufficient military strength, in
being*

Yet, without these weapons in hand at present, not

even a temporary uneasy stability is possible.

Thus, both

temporary stability and th# hope for long range stability are
dependent on the fortitude of the West within the framework
of democratic domestic political realities,

the changing

winds of the East* s skill and error in short term tactics
and long range strategy, while not changing the basic real

ities of the Vest*3 unfortunate position, cause this vital
factor of fortitude to ebb and flow like a frail reed in the
tide of human events, not entirely uncontrolled, but of
questionable reliability.

Chily successive warning signals

from the East have kept the stamina of the West fn»m disas
trously ebbing beyond the point of no return.

Withdrawal of

these warning signals by the East, if possible internally
over an appreciable period of time before a definitive set*
tlement of outstanding East-West problems, might well be
catastrophic to the West when the struggle is rejoined under
the East's coMitions.

To depend on toe mistakes of the

East for continuation of the patient firmness of the West,
backed by means, appears to be the greatest single political

a W military weakneaa of the Meat.
fhia sombre background of the implications of force
to the West as an element of policy has unfo&d with in*
creasing clarity since 1945.

Any study of force, general or

specific, without reference to this background would be
meaningless.

Especially is this true in examining criti

cally any aspect of the post-World War II defense establish
ment of the United States, the cornerstone of the West in
building a livable political and military balance in the

world of today.

Essential to understanding in this field is

recognition that:

. . . Force, like peace, is not an abstraction;
it cannot be understood or dealt with as a concept
outside of t W given framework of puzpose and
method. If this were better understood, there
could be neither the sweeping moral rejection of
international violence which bedevils so many
Americans in times of peace m r the helpless aban
donment to its compulsions and inner momentum which
characterises so many of us in times of war.7
Therefore, the framewwk of justification, purpose, and
method for using force in the present world has been de
scribed above solely as a necessary scaffold from which to
hang the pacific historical problem of this study.

A sober

analysis of the following problem would indeed be futile
except as a depressing portion of the entire melancholy

scener
The historical problem. Between 1945 and 1950, both
7Kennan, 90,

.9the defense structure of the Baited States and the policy
for utilising this structure were subjected to a most search
ing and critical inquiry.

Congress provided an open forum

to hear and eaamlw divergent opinions on the form and

adequacy of the military establishawnt. Eagerly using this
platform, qualified professional men from all the amed
forces forthrightly expressed their views on all aspects of
defense posture.

In 1949i the fires of controversy finally

raged unbridled in the hearings on the B-36 heavy bomber and
on unification and strategy.

The underlying cause of these

last public hearings was the openly revealed dissatisfaction
of many leaders of the Bnlted States Kavy with the course
being set by the Department of Defense in maintaining the
armed forces.

Not only were these leaders displeased with

the implications of the Department of Defense action on the

naval ready force, but they also saw the gravest dangers for
the Nation present in the strategic policy being shaped by
the limitations of available military means.

If this naval

opinion concerning serious deficiencies in strategic policy
was correct, then the timing of the warning was peculiarly
appropriate, coming as it did with the recognised loss of
the Western atomic power monopoly and only a few short months
before the Korean Incident.

This study will examine and

evaluate the position on the problws of unification and
strategy thus taken by the Navy between 1945 and 1950, with
particular emphasis on the critical year, 1949.

The frame-

»xo«*
work for using force in the present world, described earlier,
provides a convenient template, or yardstick, for this evalu
ation,

However, in order to join the Mavy in orderly mar

shalled array as a bellwether of defense during unrecognised
years for decision, the record must first review some prior
developments of the national military establishment.

0ÜAPT3R II
PLANTING 8E5D8 Of NAVAL DISCONTENT
* . . any step that 1# not good for the Navy 1# not
good for the Nation, --fleet Admiral Erneet J, Klngl
Compartmentalized naval force unchailenged before
World War II.

Before world War II the Navy had cherished

and sustained the confidence of the Nation as Its primary
force la being during time of peace.

Due to the Insular

position and essentially defensive attitude of the United
States with respect to other major power centers, this con
fidence was entirely warranted since only by sea could
appreciable lend, sea, or even air forces be deployed effec
tively against the homeland.

The diffusion of power abroad.

Including a satisfactory naval balance, gave the Navy the
capability of shielding the Nation during any mobilization
of Industry and the Army required for decisive major land
operations.
An Impotent ground Army wholeheartedly conceded to
the Navy this primary role In defense and forced the conces
sion on the prematurely ubiquitous Army Air Corps, dreaming
^Committee on Military Affairs, United states Senate,
Hearings on S, 84, Department of Armed forces, and 8. 1462,
6epertmën%^of MlXi tar y leburl ty, 7f übng,, r cess., 12W»
Hereafter cTted as Senate 1$45 Unification Hearings.
-
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of mot yet existing global range.

As late as May of 1938,

while Austria lay ravished and the peripheral disaffection
in Ozeohoslovakia proceeded apaoe, the Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Army reflected this official national and Army
obliviousness to possible future change in defense concepts
by the following brusque admonition to his logistic expert,
correcting him for planning a long renge bomber program;
(1) our national policy contemplates preparation
for defense, not aggression, (2) Defense of sea areas,
other than within the coastal zone, is a function of
the Navy, (3) The Military superiority of . . . a s-17
over the two or three smaller planes that could be
procured with the same funds remains to be established,
in view of the vulnerability, air-base limitation and
complexity in operation of the former type. . . . If
the equipment to be provided for the Air Corps be that
best adapted to carry out the specific functions
appropriately assigned it under Joint Action . . .
there would appear to be no need for a plane larger
than the B-17.^
Even more rastrictively, the Secretary of War warned
the Chief of Air Corps less than three months later that his
budget estimates for Fiscal Tear 1940 would be confined to
twin engine and smaller types.^

Fiscal Year 1940 was to end

with the death throes of France.

Fortunately, the relent

less march of events finally imposed not only changes in the
^ a r k 8. Watson, Chief of staff; Prewar Plans and
Preparations (unnumbered vol.", £eni 'Ebierts""§reenfieII,"’el*,
t#nlte& states Army in World War II) » 36, citing Memo, DC of s,
Maj . 6 c m — (later It. Gen.} Stanley D. Bmblck for AC of 8 0-4,
9 may 38, C of S files 17640-115.
^Loc. cit., citing Memo SW for C of AC, 29 July 38,
C of 8 files 17SÎ0-115.

-13#trat#*io ooaeept allowing aaeh ahortalghted military budget
planning, tout in actual appropriations as wall.

The twin

blight# of first, a purely passive defense, and second, the
iron curtain dividing both surface end air defense responsi
bilities at the ocean coast, faded before bringing irrevoc
able disaster in world war II.

Nevertheless, despite these

later developments, the Havy in July of 193d, after 140 years
as the primary shield of the Nation, still stood unchallenged
in that role,

seven short years after, the Havy was fight

ing for bare survival as a recognized and effective coequal
partner in forming total balanced armed forces for the
United statea under rational central control.
Heed for top management in applying force, without
going into these seven hectic years of violant transition for
the details of cause and effect that so radically changed
American views on accepted methods of organizing and applying
force. Nelson supplies an obvious answer as to the result
of this periods
, . . That national defense or security has always
been essentially a single over-all problem has been
recognised from the beginning of our nation toy the
designation of the President as Commander in Chief.
It is unfortunate that he has lacked in increasing
measure, as war has become more and more complex, the
top management facilities vital for intelligent decisions and able leadership, when defense problems were
simple and divisible into well defined and non-over
lapping areas and responsibilities, the Cabinet sufficed
for counsel and the separate war and Mavy Departments
for operations. That this is no longer true has been
amply demonstrated by the fact that wherever there
was prolonged fighting in world war II, air, sea,
end ground forces have been forced toy circumstances

**14“
to operate under one commend. What ham not been
advertised is that lack of organizational cohesion
at the top in Washington has made unity of command
in the field more complicated and difficult. . .
Stating the need for top management facilities in the
defense establishment was easy, but satisfying that need
presented complex problems of organization, not readily
apparent because of their deceptively simple superficial
appearance.
The naval view on postwar organization of balanced
forces.

The Mavy initially stood almost alone in its belief

that all the deep-rooted implications of a reorganized defense
structure should be thoroughly understood before adopting a
solution.

In the face of unilateral Army plans, the naval

leaders felt from the outset of postwar unification clamor
that the views of the Navy were doomed to subordinate status,
or worse, within the armed forces unless the most stringent
safeguards for protecting the Navy became a recognized part
of the new organizational legislation being considered by
Congress,

with one voice the Navy began its fight for sur

vival in October of 1945 before the congress and continued
its verbal warfare unabated until, reluctantly, the Army con
ceded most of the Navy's limitations on overly concentrated

would work together under a mutually agreed-on unification
^Najor General otto L. Nelson, Jr., National security
and the General Staff, 586.

-15plBn, passed the neeessary legislation whieh beeame lew in
Jnly of 1947,

The Navy had von & major victory by ineuring

itself parity in policy formulation within the defense
establishment, but the battle had been long and arduous.
The relative positions of the protagonists during this
struggle have a direct bearing on the problem under conslderation and will be discussed in some detail.
First, examination of the Navy*s position toward
unification legislation reveals marked consistency with its
later stand on unification and strategy taken in 1949, when
the naval misgivings were finally confirmed in spite of the
legislative safeguards for the Navy and national security
insisted upon earlier.

Basically, the Navy's attitude on the

composition of the post-world war II military establishment
was not that of bureaucratic pride of place hesitant to fall,
but rather of reluctance to have the Nation discard one con
cept of compartmentalised force, demonstrably inadequate for
modern conditions, and substitute another with equally
demonstrable fallacies.

The danger existed that placing the

armed forces in an organizational strait jacket immediately
after the war would freeze progressive military thought
instead of insuring the continued evolution of the powerful

situations of the future.

5

The proposed establishment of a

separate Air Force as a coequal service divorced from both

^Senate 1945 Unification Hearings, 123-124.

•loArmy

Navy,

whan aappoaeaiy Integratad mlth the

operation of ground and eea foreee by control from above,
oauaed the Navy particular concern because of fear that
undue emphasis on the most powerful single eleCient of present
day force might allow less powerful, but none the less
essential, elements of military power to wither away.

The

historical example of Germany provided a stern warning of how
the existing prejudices Inherent In overly centralized
control could prevent the realization of the full potential!»
ties of all the services.^
Above all, the Navy's proud record as the only branch
of the armed services with long unified fighting experience
In all pbyslcal environments, on, over, and under the sea, as
wall as In adjacent land and air areas, entitled the Navy to
voice expert opinion In formulating legislation for effective
coordination of all the armed forces,

only In strategic air

operations and massive ground engagements was the Navy
admittedly out of Its element, which it quite properly con
ceded as an Army primary function.

However, the necessity of

separating strategic air or all combat air from the Army
seemed an absurd division substituting widespread trlpllflcatlon for the close duality of Army and Navy operations
evolved during forld war II.— The Navy's submarine forces---ware a strategic, global weapon of tremendous striking power
6lbld.. 121

-17like strategic air, yet received the necessary autonomy
within the naval establishment to develop mailmum eapa7
bilitiea.
/my further dispersal of responsibility for the
training, supply, and operation of proved fighting teems
would be dangerous and wasteful to a high degree,

t.ir power,

although the dominant element of modern war, as recognized
by the Navy's policy that any important task force must have
a flying officer as commander or vice-commander, was still
part of the total balanced fighting teem.

Similar dominance

of the Army by its airmen appeared to be the proper solution
to the air problem.

The Navy could recognize the possible

desirability of a third major division of the armed forces
only if the Army's past bungling in falling to recognize the
potency of the air weapon had now not only alienated its own
airman, but also put the shoe on the other foot where the
ground forces needed autonomy for self-preservation.

a

AS far as the hiatus between see and land operations
was concerned, the Navy was adamant about full control of
its Marines, both land and air, because the Navy alone could
provide the trained teams required for full support of
amphibious operations by integrated naval bombardment, carrierbased air, landing craft, and shore control parties.

scale assaults, if sufficient dispersal could face the atomic
era, but these Army troops would still be dependent, as in
?Ibid., 390-392.

^Ibid., 3114
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World war II, on the Navy and ita Marine Corpa for training
in the epeolalized amphibious skills developed over many
9
years.
Dominant throughout the navel testimony before
Congress in 1945 was the reourring, theme that naval air
forces were an integral part of the living naval organism
and without this lifeblood the Navy perished.

These air

forces included not only oarrier-b&sed aircraft, but also
shore-based aircraft of long range for reconnaissance at sea
and antisubmarine warfare,

Developmait, supply, and training

of the naval air was peculiarly a function of the Navy and
could not be farmed out to a separate Air Force,

The airmen

for the Navy also had to be naval careerists and not on detail
from another service because one master alone must be served
with skills requiring a dedicated life of service.

The tragic

British ezperience of wiping out naval aviation and trans
ferring air duty at sea as a grubby, dead-end detail tothe
British Royal Air Force following world war I remained as a
beacon for ell to see.

In producing the beacon, Admiral

Forrest Sherman stated:
. , . As a result, in the middle of a desperate
struggle for existence, Great Britain had to reorganize her fighting forces to give the Navy control
of naval aviation, and has since been engaged in the
difficult task of attempting during & war to-modemize
its Navy and repair the damage which nearly caused the
loss of an empire,
9lbid.. 149-150,
^°Ibid.. 504.

Carryina bla aptitude for miaiogy furtuar, the aavy a&vaat
added later;
The very lateaalty of the preeent drive for the
merger, and the destructively critical nature of many
of the stataments recently made about the Navy,
atremgthen the belief that the merger would make
possible a recurrence of the conditions which led to
the esteblisnment of the Navy Department in 1796;
namely, that the War Department of that time had not
maintained an adequate Mavy and a naval campaign
was in Immediate prospect.H
Thus, in 1945, the cancelled aircraft carriar, united State*,
and unavailable moth ball carriers were already casting their
shadows before them,

how useful this close air support,

fifty miles or less from the battle line, might have been in
that classic example of naval co-operation with land forces,
Korea, during the early stagos of the North Korean advance
in 1950%

During tuls time the separate ^Ir Force, denied

Korean bases until later, struggled from maximum range in
Japan to reach the front lines for a few mlnutos fighterbomber contact.

12

Immortal as on expression of sound naval

doctrine are Churchill's words of 19)6 expressed in one of
his foresighted, but fruitless, efforts to save Britain from
future travail:
It is impossible to resist on admiral's claim that
he must have complete control of, end confidence la,
------------------------------------------------
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Mews items, Army-Mavy-Air Force journal,
15 July, 1950.

-20th# alro*»ft of the battle fleet, whether used for
reeonnsiesenoe, gun-fire, or attsok on a hostile
fleet. These are his very eyes. Therefore the
Admiralty view must prevail in all that is required
to seoure this result.
Integration of forse with other tools of polioy.
This, then, briefly describes the view of the Navy on its
own speeial skills in the art of war and the necessity for
recognizing, protesting, and further developing these skills
as a vital part of any future overall military establishment.
However, the Navy ease was not simply one of sonstrustive
opposition to merger of the war and Navy Departments.

It

was rather a somprehensive and dynamic program to strengthen
national security in all its aspects.

The Navy’s program

contrasted markedly with the wishful and false hope of the
Army that a military Oberkommando of the armed forces in
Washington would automatically bring greater effectiveness
to the field forces by ignorant meddling with the vital and
specialized problems of each of the military departments.
The greatest defect of the Army’s proposal was that it was
purely an ill-conceived military solution and failed to
provide adequate coordination in the top management of all
agencies concerned with national security,

secretary of the

Navy yorrestal stated the problem clsnrly:
The immediate integration necessary is that of the
War, Navy, and State Departments. Beyond that, however,
I wish to present to you my belief that there will be
^^fiaston 8, Churchill, The Gathering storm (I, The
second world war), 675. Hereafter cited as The fathering
Storm.
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required to meet our problem» of the future the oreatiom
of a meehanlem wlthlm the Govermmemt whioh will
guarantee that thle Nation ehall be able to aet a# a
unit In term» of its diplomaey, its military policy,
its use of scientific knowledge, and finally, of
course, in Its moral and political leadership of the
world— a leadership that shall rest on moral force
14
first and on physical force so long as we shall need it*
Consequently, the Mavy advocated that a really broad
organisation for national security be established, as
follows:
(1) A permanent National security Council with a
permanent secretariat should be established as an
integral part of our Ckivemment. It should consist
of the President as chairman, the secretaries of state
and the Military Departments, and the Chairman of the
National Resources Board. The security council will
coordinate all foreign and military policies and in
time of war will advise the president as Commander in
Chief, This Council will also review end determine
the security program and budget for submission to
Congress.
(2) There should be provided a permenent Joint
Chiefs of Staff to consist of the Chief of staff to
the President, the Chief of staff of the Army, the
Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and two
officers of the Navy, one to be a naval aviator.
Such Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish unified
commands in peace and war and will originate the
strategic military program. The subordinate agencies
of the Joint Chiefs of staff should be strengthened
and established on a permanent full-time basis.
C3) The National Security Council should be assisted
by (a) a central research agency, and (b) a central
Intelligence agency, both to serve all departments of
the government.
(4) A permanent National Resources Board should
be established to make policy decisions with respect
to the mobilisation of material resources, productive
capacity, and manpower. A permanent Military Munitions
^^Senate 1945 Unification Hearings, 97.
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B o a M (a joint aganoy), raportlng to th# National
Raeouroaa Board# will ba raaponalbla for tba elimina
tion of duplloatlona In proauramwit and supply.
{51 The Army Air forces, with particular reference
to their strategic functions, should be autonomous.
Whether that can be accomplished only by splitting the
war Department and establishing a separate department,
Is a matter for Oongress to decide. A single Military
Establishment should not be forced upon the country
to establish autonomy for the Army Air forces.
(6 ) The Navy must be continued as an Integrated
service not only with its oen Air forces (including
such shore elements as are required for design, train
ing, reconnaissance at sea, end antisubmarine warfare)
but also with Its Marine Corps and related amphibious
oojiponents. This requires that the Navy Department
continue to be represented in the Cabinet by a
civilian secretary with direct access to the President.
This program deals with the basic elements of
national security. It also preserves the integrity
of each of the armed services and provides for the;
(a) onified strategical direction of the Services,
both In Washington and in the field ; (b) effective
coordination of procuremwt; and (c) for integration
of budgets for national security,*?
The narrow view held by Army ground end air.

In

contrast with the Navy's carefully devised provision of a
top management staff for advice on and execution of the
security policies of the Oommander In Chief, the Army pro
posed that the President abrogate most of his power over the
military under the Constitution by delegating his responsi
bilities not on a staff basis, but on a deceptively simple
straight line command basis.

The Army proposal was general

In character and left details of organization to be settled
by executive action rather than by legislative authority.
. 470.

In

-23mpite of assuremoes that aiaeentera among thoae charged with
ooptrol of the major oompoaent* of the armed foroea eould
still obtain a hearing from the President by going over the
heads of their military and eivlllan superiors, there was no
regular system provided for insuring careful consideration of
all pertinent views before a decision was reached on military
matters.

However, the greatest deficiency was failure to

coordinate and direct the military as a part of the total
power of the Ration.
A comparison between the Navy’s plan and the Army’s
plan, presented by General "Lightning foe" Collins,

16

shows

the vast area of difference between the two opposing concepts*
Instead of the closely knit Presidential staff on all secur
ity aspects provided by the National security Council and the
National Resources Board as advocated by the Navy, the Army
proposed only a single adviser on military matters alone, a
civilian Secretary of the Armed forces.

Although in nominal

charge of the entire military establishment with the aid of
other civilian assistant secretaries of the single department
as a whole, the actual command of the armed forces was in the
hands of the military in the person of a Chief of Staff of
the Armed forces.

The Army provided no civilian secretaries

of the component branches to supervise their detailed opera
tions,

That was also left in the hands of military commanders*

By contrast, the Navy retained the autonomous civilian

*^Ibid., 156-162.
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B#eretari#6 of eeeh oompoDeot.

% e Army plan usurped com-

pletely the strategic direction of unified field oomnandm by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed so effectively during
World war II by the principal military advisory and operat
ing agency of the President.

The Navy proposed to retain

this group wil^full powers to Insure that preplanning of
operations considered every pertinent factor, but the Army
kept the Joint Chiefs in name only with limited powers of
recoimendatlon.

Although these recommendations of all the

principal component commanders would be forwarded to the
President through the secretary, the operating functions of
the Joint Chiefs passed entirely Into the grasp of the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces.

The Arsgr^s plan provided for

a considerable degree of autonomy for each service, yet major
functions might be transferred between the components.

The

Navy, of course, required legislative safeguards to prevent
such arbitrary and possible destructive action to proved
fighting teems.

Also very objectionable, In the Kavy»s view,

was a Director of Common supply and Hospitalization, directly
under the Armed Forces Chief of staff according to the Army's
plan, with powers potentially capable of starving functions
to death without more overt action,

under the Navy plan, Its

Cabinet level Secretary and equal voice in the joint staff
agencies prevented any such sabotage by those unfamiliar with
the special needs of sea power.
The fervor with which both the ground and air Army
componemts advocated their cause was uaderstandable, but not

-25meoessarlly In the beet Intereete of the Ketlon.

With &ir

power reoognized ae dominent by all, the Army Air Poroee felt
that through additional autonomy within a single armed foroe#
department their sledge hammer of power with emphasis on the
atom would receive untrammeled development.

Its advocate#

Indicated little If any Interest In lesser nuances of power,
and apparently failed to realize that tack and claw hammer#
can sometime# repair structures better than a sledge hamner
designed for destruction,

on the other hand, the ground Army,

while recognizing th# value of Its Frankenstein, but not being
able to control it like the Navy, preferred to free the
monster before it destroyed the foot soldier.

Forrestal

mentions the fears of both the president and the secretary of
War:
I said that Patterson and I both had some mlsglvIttgs about the Ground Forces being extinguished by the
efforts of the levy and the Air Forces, The president
concurred and said what he was really afraid of was
that we would have a repetition of the situation in
England. In other words, the Royal Air Force movement
with all of Its concequences. I told him that I
thought If I were in his place I would In a week or
ten days tell both services It was time to call a
halt to the propaganda discussion and lobbying, and
I said the Navy would make this stick but I didn’t
think the Army could, particularly the Air Forces,
Re concurred and said that the Air Forces nad no
discipline. . . . If
^^Walter Minis, ed.. The Forrestal plarlcs, 149.
Hereafter cited as Forrestal.

CHAfTBm III
mOGBT mOAD TO OOWmOMISE
. . . Believe entirely fresh appm&oh re
quired* . .1 te avoid that sold, fishy look
whioh lets you be quite aware. . . that you do
not have the kind of support from the heart that
you need in fitting,2— Secretary of Defease
Forrestal
laitial Presldeatlal support

ÿî A S K .

In spite of

his awareness of the Army*a pressure tactics, Kerry 3. Truman,
ColoiMil, Artillery, Organised Reserve Corps, was not the
Bavy’s adv^ate.

Hushing to reinforce the Army, which was

sorely flailed by the Navy's telling blows, the President
sent a maaaaga to Congress on 19 December 1945 backing the
Army's position item for item except for four minor conces
sions to palliate a Congress increasingly favorable to the
Savy.3

These points were, first, the Navy would retain its
^oamittee on NSval Affairs, United States Senate,

m I*

Cong*, 2 sees., 10*
tion Hearings*

S M Mssâ

79

Hereafter cited as Senate 194»Unifica

^Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,
#

£• M l

1 sees., 3o.

MSIasSl^MSiSS

Cong.,

Hereafter cited as Senate 1947 Unification

Hearings.
3lbid. . 9-10, citing Message to Congress from the
President. December 19. 1945. in dailv Congressional Record.
PP, 12573-12577.
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-27earrler

mû

w»t#r»ba#$d aviation although land*haaod alroraft

for reoonnalaaano# ware still to ha mannad by th# Air force;
second $ the Marina Corps would still be part of the Navy
although its functions ware dlsqulatlmgly vague; third, ad
ditional Assistant Secretaries for each component would w a i 
ter the activities of the military commands although no
Cablwt level representation or its equivalent was possible;
and fourth, later legislation would attempt to meet the pri

mary problem of more effective staff assistance on all secur
ity wtters at the Presidential sumslt.

Any reassurance that

this might have been to a Congress dedicated to the principle
of government by law instead of men was dampened, however, by
a suggestion that details need not be specified, but (Aould

be left to executive order.
Congress aat Navy frustrate President ggd Army.
Meanwhile, amid increasing cheers and support from the floor
of Congress, the Navy had already successfully run the
gantlet of a Senate Military Affairs Committee.

Now the

setting was to change during the 1946 session to the Senate
Naval Affairs Committee, wearing bell-bottomed blue.

Here

the Navy found a w e t welcome relief frmm the 1945 experience

before a khaki-tainted Military Affairs Committee.

The Navy

needed only to pass the ball to the Naval Affairs Committee
without worrying about which goal line would be crossed.
Moreover, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee was
suffering from an understandable pique at the rather arbitrary

way im whieh th# Military Affaira Commit ta# had pr#aa#d for
ward indapamdantly im favorable oomaideratiom of the Amy» s
plaa for unification during the 1945 seeaion.

At laat, leas

than two weeks before reporting favorably to the Senate on a
slightly modified version of the Army»# plan,^

Senator llbert

Thomas, Democrat of Utah, Chairman of the Military Affairs

Committee, in stammering embarrassment quite divorced from
his usual professorial manner, attempted to mollify the laval
Affairs Comaittee and its Chairman, who had dotermlnedly
begun their own hearing on the same proposed bill.

Ungram

matically, Thomas apologised on 30 April 1946:

%

purpose, Senator Walsh— and I don*t have to

state the purpose to you, because I have worked
with you f m m the first day I came to Wa«6ington,

on some of the most controversial legislation, aod
you know the spirit in which I have undertaken all
of my jobs, and one thing I hope I never will do
is try to short-cut any consideration of any bill;
and a bill of this kind should not be short-cut.^
The Chairman, Senator Wvid Walsh, Dewcrat of Massachusetts,
and the rest of the Senate Maval Affairs Go^ittee topk
Thomas at his word.

Hot only was the proposed legislation

freed of any stigma of steam roller tactics used in promoting
it, but this liberation killed the bill completely.
From the naval point of view, the bill recommended by
Thomas

contained all the previously objectionable provisions

6.
^Senate 1946 Unification Hearings, 10.
1 ~9 .
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of th# Amy*# plaa, although th# fr##ld#at*« laadaquat# coacassloa# were inoluded.

Squally uaattraotiT# to the Savy

appeared the additional froatiag of giving the Aasistaat
Seeretarie# of Army, Navy, and Air fore# the nominal title
of full Secretary of their respective components, hut with
no change in their ineffectual, subordinate status.

Also, a

travesty of the Navy* s top management plan for integrating
all security matters had been added in an attempt to disarm
naval advocates of this supreme need.

The facsimile was

excellent except that, when viewed in the lAole context of
t W bill, the super-Secretary of Common Defense and his mili
tary Chief of Staff, the latter particularly, still held
absolute rein on the military establishment.

The component

Secretaries were not even granted a place on the proposed
Council of Common Defense, this bill*s equivalent of the
National Security Council recommended by the Navy.
This mnstrous deviation from the jprinciples of
sound business management needled Charles E. "Electric" Wil
son iidio an anguished cry before the Naval Affairs Co^ittee:
. . . I am convinced that merely starting at
the top and combining the two departments into
one, with a concentration of administrative author
ity in the hard pattern of military authority, at
the cost of devaluation of the Importance and
stature and Independent thinking of the present
separate departments, is an invitation to inef
ficiency, to authoritarianism, and to stultifica
tion*
What we need is less, not more, rigidity. We
need more flexibility in order to make the liaison
between industry and the armed forces work. We
need a structure that will not suppress the think
ing of specialists down the line, but will invite

30»
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or even oompol their thinking to oome out and be
weighed end tested.7

Speaking apologetically of the email, billion dollar, yearly
business of his company, General Electric, as infinitesimal
compared to the vast, diversified activities of the defense
establishment, Wilson added, "Rejecting central authority,

we found we had to gc to the other route, not the one that
according to my understanding is the route considered under

this bill; we had to decentralise. . .

The goal, as the

Navy and its supporters had long realised, was to **. • . seek

real unity of thought and action, not just a unification of
organisation which does nothing in itself to reduce the num

ber and complexities of the problems involved,"*
Presidential and Armv retreat. With growing recog
nition of the futility of his past arbitrary intervention In

favor of the Army’s proposed unification plan, the President
sought finally on 13 May 1946 to inspire the Army and Navy
to reach agreement on legislation that both could support.

At this time, talking to Patterson and Forrestal, the Army
and Navy Secretaries, the President admitted that one of the

biggest stumbling blocks to agreement, the concept of the
omnipotent super-Chlef of Staff in military command of all
the finciting forces, bad been a dangerous mistake, sowing
7lbid.. 149.

130.
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for a potential "man on hore#baok."10

fie request

ed that the two Secretaries reach agreement by 31 Nay in the
hope that a united front to Congress might allow passage of
a unification law before the Seventy-ninth Congress ground
to a close*
Increasing evidence had indicated that neither House
of Congress would consider favorably the m>dified plan of
the Army proposed by the Senate Military Affairs Committee,
or any substitute plan, unless the services reached sub
stantial agreement on the imrklng details in such a manner
as to warrant the concurrent support of those Congressmen
who shared the Navy*s misgivings.

In a devastating indict

ment of the Army plan and with argment closely parroting
the Mavy, Senator David Walsh of Massachusetts and Repre
sentative Carl Vinson of Georgia, Democratic Chairmen,
respectively, of the Senate and House Maval Affairs Cornaittees, presented a letter to Forrestal on 15 May for use as
aamunition in his conferences with Patterson during which
both men tried to meet the President* s request for a joint
solution to the unification {problem,

The recommended agenda

of Walsh and Vinson concerning the primary points at issue
took the position that;
With respect to the points in disagreemmot we
are of the opinion that the Congress of the United
States after mature study and deliberation will
not approve:
(a) A single Department of Common Defense

i%orrestal, 160-162.

«
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wltii a single Secretary at Its head.
(b) The placing of a single military officer
in s o w erne command of all the armed forces.
(c) Divesting the Marine Qarpm of its im
portant function of maintaining a fleet Marine
Force to suppwrt fleet operations.
(d) Transferring the vital functions of
naval aviation to the Army Air Corps or to a
separate Air Corps.
(e) Removing from the Secretary of War and
the Secretary of the Mavy the responsibility
for initiating the budget of their respective
Departments and supporting these budgets be
fore the Congress.il

forrestal*s strengthened position mas clearly evident
in the joint reply of the Secretaries to the President on

31 M a y . A realistic proposal for necessary coordination
of all security matters at the highest level now included
effective representation of each service Secretary.

Re

luctantly, but obedient to the President, Patterson had
agreed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the highest military
level of command in place of the single military Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces.

Kowever, disagreement still exist*

ed concerning the single super-Secretary and the effective

ness of the service Secretaries as autonomous agents in
directing their own departments under the over-all Secretary.
The Mavy also resisted as vigorously as before the continued
efforts of the Army and Army Air Force to aggrandise the
vital naval functions of land-based aviation for fleet recon
naissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of ship
ping.
llaenate 1946 Unification Hearings, 351.

203'"207,

-23Pftttdrson also spelled out for the first time, publicallf, the Army's view on the functions of the Karine
Corps*

Although Forrestal could agree with Patterson in the

generality of a balanced force of Marines, including sup
porting air, for duty with the Mavy, he would not grant the
limiting of Marine capabilities and missions only to those
situations where sustained land fighting was not required.
The Mavy obviously required staying power for its Marines if
limited land warfare was required to prosecute successfully
a naval campaign.

Functionally, such a situation could not

be soundly met by tortuous liaison and ineffective coordina
tion with the Army unless t M magnitude of the land operation
clearly made the naval aspects subordinate.

In a#>hibi#us

warfare, usually the most vital element of such a sea-land
campaign, the Aimy proposed limiting the Marines to primary
responsibility for only waterborne developments in the tac
tics, techniques, and equipment of landing operations.
This absurd severance between sea and shore of func
tions required to blend in smooth-flm#lng unity was an in
vitation to dual command and responsibility for one of the
most delicate and dangerous of all operations.

Past exper

ience had dictated that the tightest and most coordinated of
command controls were vital for success.

The contrast be

tween Guadalcanal and Marvik was made apparent by Marine
General Vandegrift in commenting on the disastrous effect
on the Nation If Marine readiness were reduced:

-
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. . * Th® result3 of such a situation may bs
ttx®^lifl®4 by ooosiderlng idiat would hav® be
fallen our Nation had there been no Marine Corps
standing in readiness in the early days of the
recent war. . . . The operation against Guadal
canal could not have been launched when it was,
because there were at that time no A m y troops
prepared to conduct amphibious assault operations.
And had we been without a vigorous and effective
Marine Corps at the onset of the war t W United
States would have found Itself In the hapless po
sition of the British, who, for want of a «sail
professional landing force, suffered a disastrous
defeat in Norway. . . . The loyal Marines, tradi
tional troops of the British Navy, had been
divested of their amphibious function# and were
engaged in duties of lesser signifi cance— such
as operation of landing boats. By the time troops
could be alerted for the task the fleeting op
portunity was lost and German strength in northern
Norway bad reached such formidable propcrticns
that an attack was no longer practicable.13
That tragedy of grievous error, Narvik, involved what
the United States could ill afford to do in the future—

”. . . putting in a substitute for a well-run team, a substi
tute who has not trained with the team and %Ao does not know
the signals. * .

Churchill’s difficulty with the substi

tute, General Mackesy and his Army troops, at Narvik, and
his efforts to forge a fighting team on the spot are well

recorded.15

However, the saddest commentary of all about

the deficiencies of the Royal Navy while in control of com
bined amphibious operations at Narvik, even after supreme
command of the area %ms belatedly granted the Navy, is the

.

^ Ibid.. 110

l^lbid., 112.
^5yhe Gathering Storm. 605-610, 632-637, 651-657.

-35admi##ion of th# First Lord that his *. . . naval officers,
even when granted the fullest authority, are chary of giving
orders to the Army about purely military matters. . .
ïhàs defect contrasted markedly with the knowledgeable confi
dence of Admiral Nimits and Marine General «Howling Mad"
Smith in directing Army commanders detailed to them for duty
during World War II in the Pacific Ocean area.

Still Patter

son did not get the point and looked at the Marines as rivals
to the Army ground forces instead of as naval specialists
with peculiar skills necessary for the conduct of most naval
campaigcs.
In spite of later remarks comparing Marine propaganda
with that of Stalin, the President at this time opposed the
injudicious conclusions about the Marines made by his Secre
tary of War.

In his effort to close the Army and Mavy ranks

into a unified front to Congress, the President did not
choose to leave the untenable A m y position on the Marines
as a wide gap for warranted Congressional attack.

On 15

dune, in his letters of wnclliation to Patterson, Forrestal,
and the dhalrmen of the Senate Military and Maval Affairs
Committees^ which attempted to reconcile the differences in
the joint-reply of the Secretaries of 31 May, the President
stood firmly with the "leather-necks” and accepted the
Mavy*8 position verbatim on the functions and missions of
16ISiâ-, 635.

—
the Marine Corps.
Another major Presidential concession was the de
priving of the proposed Secretary of Common Defense of powers
and functional Assistant Secretaries in the fields of Research,

Intelligence, Procurement, and Training because of unwarrant
ed and unnecessary usurpation and duplication of both the
policy guidance provided by the President» s top management

staff agencies and the functions of internal administration
essential to the service secretaries.

In the joinKletter of

31 Hay from the Secretaries to the President, Forrestal, al
though opposing the ubiquitous super-Secretary, bad recognised

the advantages of a Preaidenta&l defense deputy to lessen the
burdens of the President's far flung and excessive govern
mental span of control.

According to Forrestal, this deputy

should have well defined powers of delegated authority from

the President for deciding issues at the Council of Common
Defense l e v e l , A t last, the Secretary of Common Defense
approached this concept at the military level, althou# For

restal* s scheme achieved more rationally the recognised prin
ciples of organisation by having this deputy mesh and coordi
nate representatives on the Council in all security elements,
foreign affairs, and industry, as well as the military estab
lishment.
Only in land-based aviation did the Kavy receive no
additional help from the President.

The decision here, in

17senate 1946 Unification Hearings, 207-211.
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the Président»â words, was that:

Land-based planes for naval reconnaissance,
antiambaariae warfare and protection of shipping
can and should be manned by Air Force personnel. If
the three services are to work as a team there must
be close cooperation, with interchange of personnel
and special training for specific duties.*?
Nevertheless, the Secretary of the Mavy was at last prepared
to admit that the President's objectives were feasible provid#
ing legislation properly construed these objectives.

On 24

June, acknowledging the President» s letter of 15 June, which
had otherwise confirmed all previous concessions to naval air,
Forrestal commented on the touchy subject of land-based air

for sea reconnais sance:
. . . X am glad to note that the Mavy is to
have a continuing part in the future development
of these operations, so that full advantage may be
taken of its experience in this field and of the
lessons learned in the late war. . . .20
Otherwise, Forrestal*s letter completely supported the Presi
dent's decisions.

What reservations Forrestal may have had

concerning the Air Force's ability to be the Navy's long
range eyes were now at least protected as possible future pro
tests.

The inviolate preservation of naval

integrity and

autonomy at all levels, including the Council of Common De
fense, allowed the Secretary the right of direct appeal to
the President, which was nearly as effective as full Cabinet
status.

Also, Congress was standing careful guard over the

Navy and blocking any legislative loopholes inimical to

3>9ibid.. 208.
20ibid.. 211$

naval interests.
Retreat ends

^

debacle.

Following the President’s

letters of 15 dune, idtich stated the objectives unification
legislation should now accomplish, the Senate Maval Affairs
Coonittee was happy to let the onerous chore of redrafting
suitable legislation go unchallenged to a hapless Senator
Thomas, whose bill, approved by his Military Affairs Committee, remained on the Senate calendar,

Thomas vainly attempted

to do this the hard way by amendments to the original bill.
The resultant confusions in the text left the super-Secretary

far more power than Forrestal intended to agree with in his
letter of 24 dune to the President, which had supported the
Presidential objectives.

Therefore, the Mavy was forced to

complain that the President’s intent was not fulfilled by
the revised

p r o p o s a l . 21

In g^ite of this, Thomas’s revision bore the caption,
”Printed with the amendments of the Senate carrying out the

recommendations of the President in his letter to Senator
Thomas of Utah of dune 15.*%2

The Naval Affairs Committee

feared that the rug might be pulled out from under the Mavy
by the President if he stated that this new Military Affairs
Committee bill met the objectives with which the Navy had
expressed agreement.23

These valiant supporters of the Navy

2^Ibid.. 215.

22lbid.. 214.
217-21S.
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held the line with forbidding mien and prevented any further
attempt at Freeidential or Army ineuraiona until Porreatal
welded ahut the gap he bad inadvertently left in the naval
armor.

With riveta added for good meaaure, the atacoato tone

of Porreatal*a telegram from Bikini on 5 duly to Kenney, hia
deputy, found its way into the hearings of the Naval Affaira
Committee.

There it proved an effective accompaniment to

these winners of the Navy **B" for 1946 while th^ sang a
spirited «Anchors Aweigh" in requiem over the lifeless Array
merger bill.

Porrestal*s musical note read:

X have studied amendments to Thomas bill. As
I read them they fall completely short of correcting
numerous basic defects of organisation originally
proposed which was and still continues to be an ad
ministrative ^nstrosity. Am convinced it is utterly
impossible to incorporate directives of Presidmt *s
plan into framwork of Thomas bill. Believe entirely
fresh approach required. . . . I feel strongly that
Senate Naval Affairs Committee should be given op
portunity for participation in development of
legislation equal to that already M d by Senate
Military Affairs Committee. Please transmit this
message to Senator Walsh and leave to his discretion
decision as to public r e l e a s e . *4
Walsh was exceedingly discreet from the Navy*s point
of view.

Succinctly, a Congressional summary states, in

part, «but opposition continuing, the President requested
that the measure be

dropped."2$

violent pressure tactics of the

Thus, ignominiously, the

Army ground

and air ended.

The next move was ?orrestal*s «fresh approach.”
24lbid.. 34Ô.
25Senate 1947 Unification Hearings, 7.
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Qrand Gomoroalaa of 1947. In setting the stage for
the Eightieth Congress, President Trusian made every effort
to avoid the past stigma of arbitrary exeeutive action in
formulating unification legislation.

The Navy was recognised

as a coequal partner in every step of the process.

To

counter-balance the past dominance of the Army and Army air
in his counsels, the President now set up in his own office
a steering committee for drafting new legislation.

This

group could hardly be charged with Army bias because Admiral
Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President, and Clark Clifford,
recently transformed from naval aide to civilian assistant in
the Executive Office, were the two principal members.2^
Because of the need of the Presidential drafters for
close liaison with the War ami Navy Departments, Admiral
Sherman and General Norstad, top flight aviators and planners,
were designated by Porreatal and Symington, Assistant Secre
tary of War for Air, to assist at the departmental level in
keeping everyone in mutually agreed

channels.27

Starting at

Porreatal* s suggestion to Symington in early November, these
military statesmen made phenomenal progress.

By mid-December,

a critically needed directive on unified command in seven
potential theaters of operation was prepared, approved, and
implemented following their recommendation to the Joint
26pOrrestal, 203-204.
27s*nate 1947 Unification Hearings, 154.

Chief# of S t a f f . T h i s o#o###ary preliminary of good faith
in assigning stratégie responsibilities and missions fostered
rapid agreement on the broader aspects of unification.

On

16 January 1947» the wmplete concurrence of Sherman and

Norstad on the substance of the new unification legislation
found fruition in another joint letter of Patterson and For-

restai to the President.29

This letter, although framed

« . . . within the scope and spirit, . ."30 of the President's
decisions in June of 1946, showed far more political as well

as military realism than the interchange of views the previous
spring.

Everything was well pinned down including, above

all, retention by the Navy of full control of its own landbased aircraft for reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare,
and protection of

shipping.31

The same team of Norstad and Sherman, assisted by
the White House steering msmittee, quickly drafted a truly
united front of recommended legislation.

The President

transmitted the proposed bill to Congress on 26 February
1947,32

tith comparatively little sniping at a Democratic

bill by a Republican Congress, who found faint support for
their antics from a military at last speaking with almost

26lbid.. 7, 164.
29ibid.. 103-106, 164.
30 l b M .. 103.

31lbixi.. 105.
32ibid. . 1, 164-167.
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one voice in support of the legislation, unification finally
became law on 26 July 1947 and Forreatal was confirmed as

Secretary of Defense the next day.33

A large measure of the

credit for final passage must go to the Army and Army Air
Force, who belatedly had recognised that joining the victors
is necessary to be successful in a campaign where unassisted
conquest is impossible.

On the other band, Porreatal and the

Navy, in proper humility, prided themselves only for a co
operative venture preserving balanced forces as versatile
instruments of national policy.

No longer, as forrestal put

it, did the Navy fear being forced into the disloyal position
where :
. . . men can say, "Aye, aye, sir,* but they
can still give you that cold, fishy look which
lets you be quite aware of the fact that they do
not agree with you, that you do not have the kind
of export from the heart that you need in fightThe new unification law resembled closely Forrestal*s
statesmanlike vision of top level security management ex

pressed so forcibly in 1946.35

included in the National

Security Act of 1947 were Forrestal* s original key concepts
of a Presidential staff, the National Security Council for
33Forrestal, 295, 297.

34senate 1947 Unification Hearings, 36.
35See Suora. pp. 3LN-22. Committee on Armed Ser
vices, United States Senate, Hearings on S, 1269 and
1843.
Nation^ Security
Aw o d m n t s 'p ^ i 9 p . 81 Gong., 1 sees.,
Î3ÏÎK Tacin|^60. nSêrêâlterWeïï^as%ate 1949 Unifica
tion Hearings.
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Integrmting dom#Btio, foreign, and military policy and the
National Security Reaoureea Board for coordinating military,
industrial, and civilian mobilisation.

Assisting the Nation

al Security Council was the Central Intelligence Agency as
previously contemplated.

In view of other agencies coordinat

ing broad applications of science, Porreatal*a central re
search agency became a Research and Development Board report
ing to the Secretary of Defense on scientific techniques of
military value.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, now aided by a

statutory jola&ataff equally representing the separate ser
vices, had been preserved intact as the principal military
advisers to the President and to his deputy on military
matters, the Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary now reduced

the President *s burden of excessive span of control by dele
gated authority over the autonomous department s properly
conveyed by law, a marked change from the 1945 Army concept
of blanket powers over the merged services arbitrarily or
dained by executive order.

Subject to the general supervision

of the Secretary of Defense in matters affecting the National
Military Establishment as a whole, the Secretaries of Army,
Navy, and Air Force bad full administrative control of
autonomous executive departments as well as the right of
appeal to the President concerning decisions affecting their
departments.

Their role as special advisers in their fields

was enjoined by statute in a War Council to the Secretary of
Defense, and above all, as representatives of their services

•
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on the national Security Council.

Although their place on

the Presidential succession list was lost, the President was
expected to use the Secretaries in his cabinet as needed.
The Munitions Board, as in the case of the Research and Devel*
opment Board, reported to tim Secretary of Defense instead of
to the National Security Council, but its functions were the
same as Forrestal forecast, primarily coordination of procure
ment and supply within the National Military Establishment.
Within the separate departments, the role and mission
of the three components of the armed forces had not only been
adequately defined in general t e n m in the new statute, but
the detailed Executive Order implementing the statute preserved
completely the primary functions of each service that they were
best fit by experience and tradition to perform.

The view of

the Navy had prevailed in all respects concerning the inviola
bility of the Marine Corps and naval aviation, including the
necessary land-based air, as essential tools of the naval
trade.2?
Dormant seeds of naval discontent.

In spite of this

justified deference to the naval position, the deep wounds to
the Navy, cut by the Army and Army Air Force in attempting to
sever vital functions from an operating element with %diich
they were grossly unfcuailiar, continued to fester.
3&Senate 1947 Unification Hearings, 29
37lbid.. 3-5.

Naval
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ûonfld#nce in the judgment of Army end Air Force leaders was
bound to suffer as a consequence, particularly at the higher
levels where intelligent joint planning and direction were
required in forging integrated task forces from the specialist
units provided from all branches.

By contrast, the Navy at

no time had depreciated the role and importance of the other
services.

Instead, helpful naval suggestions had emphasised

the necessity for autonomous strategic air forces, not as a
panacea, but as an essential element within the framework of
total military power with all its shades of useful applica
tion.

The Navy had also eaqpressed some misgivings about

organisational obstacles, self-imposed within the Army, that
might endanger the training, control, and effectiveness of
ground-air teams by separating all combat air from the ground
forces.

However, the Navy made no protest about the final

conclusion to transform these teams into a two-headed Hydra
under joint control of those presumed best qualified to make
that operational decision.

Nevertheless, the Navy had chal

lenged effectively the consistency of this unproved solution
as a justification for the aggrandisement by the Air Force of

dJr
all the military'^resources of the Nation.
As has been seen, most of Forrestal*s original posi

tion of 1945 was realized in the compromise legislation of
1947.

Concessions had be®i made only in the means of reduc

ing to manageable proportions the President *s Span of control
over the agencies c o m e m e d with national security.

Here,
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although the concept of a top Preaideatlal staff was retain
ed for the Wiol# field of security in order to relieve the
President of the details of planning, coordination, and
supervision of approved policy, forrestal* s re commandât ion
to have a Presidential deputy at this level with specific
delegated powers of decision would have reduced the number
of agency heads reporting to the President far more effec
tively by unified control of a single functional area than
by simply having such a deputy preside only over the three
armed services.

Nevertheless, the greater deputy, a Chair

man of the National Security Council other than the President,
was sacrificed for the lesser, a Secretary of Defense, presid
ing over the National Military Establishment,

The latter

position would have no doubt evolved eventually in any event
due to its theoretical logic in tidying up the cluttered
organisational chart of the Executive Branch, but less tan
gible obstacles, most already partially revealed by the Navy,
hid behind the theory that prettying up the chart would
automatically provide greater military effectiveness.
alone could test the compromise of 1947.

Time

CHAPTER IV
T28TINQ AND TAMPERING
. . . it is very difficult to get a correct expres
sion from the military authorities so long as the expres
sion is controlled politically before it is rendered.—
General of the Army George G. Marshall*
Magnitude of unification problems,

forrestal, the

principal architect of the new National Military Establishment,
presided over the initial crucible, a critical period of
painful trial and error in attempting to bind together power
ful subsidiaries into a mammoth corporation.

The problwa

essentially was to harmonise the contribution of each sub
sidiary to the total military power in being of the Nation in
such a manner that the sum of these contributions would
provide the Nation, to the maximum extent possible, with more
power than the subsidiaries had produced for comparable
diversions of the national effort before unification.
Obviously, the solution was an art, not a science, because
only empirical methods could provide a dubious answer due
to the infinite intangibles involved.

Cremating potential

in atomic thermal units might be forecast accurately, but
^Committee on Armed services. House of Representatives,
Hearings. The National Defense program— Unification and strategy,
El Gong., nTess., 6Ü4. Sereafter cited as House 1949
Strategy Hearings.
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th# questions of targets, percentage of potential effective
on target, and means of delivery were just a few complicating
factors affecting even the simplest and crudest of approaches
to evaluating military strength,

furthermore, if force were

to meet the criteria developed in Chapter I for its hopeful
employment as a deterrent of wars and in limiting wars, short
of mass and possibly total destruction, probably the national
interest might best be pursued with more balanced forces than
those merely capable of incineration.

Coordination of the

three services to obtain a more effective total military
team with greater power, yet at the same time flexible enough
to meet varying contingencies imposed by the changing needs
of foreign and military policy, required a dangerously
delicate adjustment and compromise of conflicting demands,
Sight answers were well nigh impossible to develop with any
d % r e e of assurance,
to the Nation,

wrong answers could have fatal results

forrestal*s new job, fraught with overwhelm

ing difficulties end dangers, assumed the greatest signifi
cance amid the narrowing choices facing the United states on
the world scene,
futility in allotting defense deficits.

These

difficult problems facing the National Military Establishment
had been further complicated by an arbitrary ceiling on
defense costs imposed by the president and the Congress long
before forrestal became Secretary of Defense,

on 13 May 1946,

the President established his policy of limiting defense

•
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appropriation request# to not more then one third of the bud»
get after meeting carrying charge# on the national debt.

2

AS a result, Forrestal, who had actually taken his oath of

office on 17 September 1947 after six weeks spent organizing
for business following his confirmation by the Senate, found
his establishment in the fiscal year ending 30 June 1948 with
the going rate of expenditure on the military forces already
well established at under fifteen billion dollars annually.^
Congress, needless to say, particularly the usually hostile

Eightieth, had cooperated with the President by showing even
greater zeal than he for across-the-board economy emphasizing

cuts in non-pork military expenditures.

Appearing nearly

oblivious to the stringent injunctions of Section 8, Article
I, of the Constitution **• • . to raise and support armies . ,*
end *. . . to provide and maintain a navy . . .«, powers that
cannot be delegated, Congress joyously accepted the parochial

view of the President as a measure of its own responsibility
also.

Perhaps the relentless march of events would demonstrate

that the visible capabilities and intentions of other powers
might have been a better yardstick for estimating our defense
needs.
Even the Communist defenestration of Czechoslovakia
into the waiting clutch of the Soviet Union and the blockade
of Berlin had little impact on the President and Congress
^Forrestal, 160.

^Ibid.. 314, 351-353.
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in establishing better criteria for judging defense needs,
AS late as 15 October 1948» Forrestal was attempting to plan
a budget within the President's limit of fifteen billion for
the fiscal year that was to end one week after the Korean
incident of 1950#

The services had estimated their needs,

within the strictest interpretations of calculated risk and
minimum pork, at a modest figure of approximately thirty
billion dollars.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, feeling perhaps

that as individual military heads of their forces they had
not been harsh enough in rending lard from their various
arms and bureaus, had finally been pushed and goaded by a
knife-wielding Mclarney Board, established by forrestal as
defense management experts in men and materials, into an
absolute minimum figure of nearly twenty-four billion.

This

annual carrying charge on insurance, so the Joint Chiefs
thought, might keep the Ration out of war and give a reason
able mobilization base with sufficiently secured strategic
air and ground-heads to insure possible victory in the event
war came.

The fifteen billion dollar limitation could only

promise the holding of the Eurasian off-shore islands end a
limited air offensive from England while the offensive power
of the Ravy and Army was forced to wither away in order to
make even this capability effective.

The extreme absurdity

of the predicament that the fifteen billion dollar annual
limit placed on the security planners of the Ration, unless
they trusted Stalin as the reincarnated world Messiah, was
pointed out by General aruenther, secretary of the Joint Staff,

•
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whom forrestal records as saylag there was no answer to the
dilemma unless, **. . * you are willing to gamble . .
on an air offensive alone.

Under these conditions, balanced

forces were Impossible to aohlsTe,

although the sledge hammer

of power, the atomic, biological* and chemical air offensive,
was a capability required as a deterrent to widespread, overt
Soviet aggression and as a tool In unlimited war with the
Soviet Union, the crying need was for Immediately employable
ground forces, supported by tactical air and naval power,
sufficient to prevent or limit soviet attempts to whittle
away at the protective Eurasian periphery, the vital area of
long-range decision for both hast and Weat.^
This quandary had no answer except Gruenther*s
gamble, skeptically received even by the Air forcé, which
found that forrestal*s views Included collateral support from
naval air for diversionary strategic strikes to assist the
prime mission of the Air force end make up for Its probable
shortage of nearby bases to the primary targets.

Also, the

continuing budget support of a supercarrier, capable of
supplementing atomic deliveries, Intruded on what the Air
force hoped to make Its unique field.^

The Navy, la Its turn,

took a jaundiced view of continuing Air force efforts to re
duce It to the same supine, helpless status as the ground

*Ibid.. 374, >02-505.
*Ibid.. 466-467, 513-514.

-52Ajpay, whloh bad loyally ecoapted t&at role la favor of the
immediate retaliatory power of the Air yoree end the Navy,
euppoeedly bound together aa mutually aupportlng etriklng
teema by the hey V.'eet end Newport egreemente.

7

Although forreetal made remarkable progreea In learn
oontrovereial areea of unlfloation auoh ae oommon air trans
port, personnel and pay policies, jol&t schooling, unified
overeeaa oowaande, and military juatloe, as Mar% Leva,^
aesietant to the Defense secretary, pointed out, atrateglo
decisions on missions and means could not be worked out as
cooperative planning ventures by mutual agreement and com
promise,

Budget restrictions posed such impossible obstacles

in the way of balanced forces that the harmonious, considered
determination of what was best for the Nation, as forrestal
had envisaged his job as Secretary of Defense, had degenerated
into hopeless efforts to resolve the bickering between the Bevy
and Air Force on what measures would be least harmful to the
Nation.

Power of decision was required after ail, even

though that decision along with insufficient means might
mean catastrophe.

An attempt had to be mude in determining

what would hurt the military posture least.

As Forrestal

phrased it during his last appearance before the Senate
Armed Services committee on 24 March 1947, four days before
leaving office, the bitter experience of eighteen months had
^Ibid.. 389-394, 475-47*.
^Senate 1949 Unification Hearings, 256-261.
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gradually changed hie opinions conoemlng the danger# of
etrong powers for the seoretary of Defense until;
. , . I am also convinced that a failure to endow
this official with sufficient authority to control
effectively the conduct of our military affairs will
force upon us far greater security risks then will
be the case if singleness of control and responsibility are achieved.?
The Hoover design for strength through weakness.
Thus, with the passing of the compromiser, also began the
first of the severe trials for the Navy in 1949, the
spectacle of a Congress blindly following the recoimendatlons
of the Hoover Commission and bent upon giving the Secretary
of Defense increased power to knock heads together In the
military establishment.

As some of the heads might be naval,

the portents of the amendments to the 1947 eot being con
sidered by Congress were not favorable.
eluded many radical changes.

10

The proposal in-

Increased authority for the

Secretary of Defense to direct and control was aided by
changing the loose amalgamation of the National Military
Establishment into a single executive Department of Defense.
The superior Cabinet status of the Secretary of Defense was
further embellished by reducing the Army, Navy, and Air Force
from autonomous executive departments to mere military depart
ments without even representation on the National security
Council to supplement their dubious Cabinet representation,

^ B i d " 9'
10 ;bid.. 265~274,

-
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A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff

presl4e& over the Joint Chiefs solely as an expediter and
coordinator of their business» yet with prestige, if not
power, that was only too reminiscent of the bugaboo military
dictator, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, so dearly
beloved by the wehrmaoht and the Army.

A vast hierarchy also

stood at the summit with a Deputy yeoretary of Defense and
Assistant gearstarlas, delving end prying into the myriad
operations of the military departments, with powers, but not
necessarily the knowledge, to rationalise budget, accounting,
supply, and personnel procedures as recommended by the
Eoover Commission.
All in all, the proposed legislation was dangerous
to the Navy and the Nation if Congress insisted on a subter
fuge to hide the basic defect of the military establishment,
a lack of means that no amount of reorganization could cure
with puerile economy.

Forrestal had left hie office as a

beaten and broken man, shattered by the overwhelming burden
of distributing deficits in national security.

Now, a

legislative screen was proposed to conceal these deficits
from the entire Nation,

Former President Hoover disclosed

the fragile character of the proposed palliative by promising
that a 10 per cent savings of one and one half billion dollars
annually in the military burden would still attain » . . . the
same ends for less expenditures, .

11

1)0-131.

Nothing was advocated,
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Bven by w r # globally mlnda4 and profaaeloaally qaallflad me*
than the former prealdeat, to eloee the gap, ten times larger
than the promised savings, between means and the ends required,
whieh obviously were not the "same ends" as the Hoover eoncept, if the military establishment were to measure up to the
criteria of force demanded by the treacherous world environ
ment.
Even Kenneth Royall, who had replaced Patterson as
Secretary of the Army, but who shared his prejudices for
straight line command, found that the despicable methods of
the Hoover Commission in crucifying the military on a cross
of waste forced him into mild rebuttal of the innuendo and
falsehoods used to promote corrective legislation*

Deliberate

misstatements of fact, such as, "Under projects for fiscal
year 1950 the Army asked for funds to modernize 102 more
tanks than it possessed,"

12

had to be answered, in this case

hy%
When the original budget estimates were made in
July 194#, the Army had in its possession the exact
number of tanks budgeted for. In September 194#, 102
tanks were transferred to the Marine Corps* The
budget was adjusted accordingly at that time.^^
To a similar accusation that a clerical error had added
thirty million dollars to the Army budget estimate, Royall
proved that the figure appeared only as a partially eradi
cated stencil correction, was not included in any totals,
175.

^^Loo. olt.
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and, further, was forwarded eorreotly in ©lean eopy to the
Bureau of the B u d g e t . Royall requested the Great sagiaeer.

In a Personal letter on 7 March 1949, to refute ten of these
flagrant falsehoods, widely publicized by one of Hoover’s
subcommittees, but the official subcommittee report was not
changed, even in the case of more glaring allegations,
equally false, such as misplacing nine thousand tanks and
falling to account for over seventy divisional sets of equip-

ment*^^
Still, over a month later, the secretary of the Army,
testifying in favor of the proposed amendments to the unifi
cation act, was careful to salve the delicate sensibilities
of the Republicans, now again a minority on the Senate Armed
Services Committee, with the following remark:
I am sure that Mr. Hoover personally, with his
many responsibilities, has not had an opportunity to
take this letter and compare it with the report, and
I do not infer there was any intention on his part
at all to misrepresent the facts or permit erroneous
Inferences to be drawn. He is a great supporter of
national defense and a fair and high-principled
American citizen,
If this rather dubious tribute is accepted at its face value,
then it can only be concluded that Hoover, by losing control
over his Commission on organization of the Executive Branch
of the Goveamment, set a rather poor example of what his
recommendations were intended to effect, namely, more efficient
direction through improved governmental organization,

^^Ibid.. 177.
l^lbld,, 174-178, 180.
^^Ibid., 174.

-57Notwlthatanding, the argumenta of the aoover ^opo aala had much merit.

Yet, as testimony leading to the ori

ginal unification act of 1947 had indicated, simple charts
and blanket authority were no substitutes for the dynamic
personal equation of superior leadership, armed with unsuppressed advice. In solving security problems,

since these

problems had been made insolvable by limit# in appropria
tions for defense, the new legislation appeared to be no
panacea for military ills, particularly when much of the
evidence favoring the legislation had been fraudulently
manufactured,
Maval impotence against Hoover normalcy.

Neverthe

less, the Navy had no defense against the proposed amend
ments because the purse strings binding the military
establishment had to be unraveled by some new means,

poli

tical and allegedly economic circumstances prevented a
defense effort sufficient for any credible answer that the
assigned missions under existing unification law and agree
ments, which required balanced forces, could be accomplished
by the three services, collectively or separately.

Therefore,

the power to improvise some sort of answer to the defease
quandary had to be devised for the secretary of Defense,
This was inevitable, and the Navy did not choose to fight a
losing battle against the overwhelming odds supporting the
organizational changes.

The array of opposition was indeed

formidable, composed of a powerful triumvirate that included

first, a President, #ho, after his re-eleotlon victory was
flashed, confident, and mmzllng dissidents opposing his
legislation;
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second, a Congress, economy-minded as nsnal

in areas of no oonoem to voting constituents; and last,
but certainly not least, the Hoover Commission, transformed
Inadvertently from a 1948 stalking-horse for Republican
sabotage of the Democratic Executive to a 1949 Presidential
and Congressional demonstration of nonpartisanship in oiling
the creaking wheels of government.

Besides, the only

legitimate ground for such a naval fight was advocacy of
more money for defense as a substitute for the organisa
tional changes designed to force quietus, although not
correctness, on Interservice wrangling.

However, even those

armed components with leas political finesse than the Ravy
recognized the futility of allegedly proposing to strangle
an economy that was and Is a vital Ingredient for long-term
vletoiy.

The Ravy saved its consummate skill for the

politically possible, which In this case certainly could
not include the correct answer, further curtailment of
economic normalcy in conspicuous civilian consumption.
Collective guilt frustrates solution of defense
quandary. Unfortunately, obtaining a correct answer to this
economic and political dilemma was the paramount requirement
for security because the power of the economy for military
use, which alone could provide the sinews necessary to save

-59th# total aoomomy, and much also of more Importano# baaldaa,
i# not maaanzad merely In terms of over-all existing or
potential eapaeity.

Militarily usable eeoaoaie power in an

era of powerful weapons oapable of quick decision is measured
primarily in terms of long-lead time items already poeseessd
in advanced designs, not common to civilian use*

This is

true regardless of whetber these economic tools of war are
jigs, hydraulic presses, and armament factories capable of
sustained military production, are a vital military inventory
of jets, plutonium activated hydrogen bombs, and other
weapons, or are essential cadres of trained individuals and
units for armament, civil defense, end military organizations*
By contrast, conspicuous production and consumption
of deep-freezers, television sets, and automobiles, while
perhaps educational as exercises in industrial management and
civilian mores, are of no value to the military power
potential unless an improbable conversion period iS inexplica
bly allowed by fortuitous events, abnormally purveyed by an
aggressor*s premature and witless disclosure of frightful
intentions and capabilities*

Even defenestrated Czechoslo

vakia, blockaded Berlin, subverted Greece, and the later
dlvulgence of soviet atomic capabilities failed to qualify as
fortuitous events for the west and the United states, except
in the most limited sense, because these incidents provided
inadequate, even though great, stimulants for a proper
defense posture*

On 21 October 1949, a month after the

-
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President's disclosure of a soviet atomic explosion, General
George Marshall, In someahat surprised optimism, noted that
the Nation's defenses had remained as well afloat as they
did In the post-world War II period largely due to overt
Soviet pressure.
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However, only the Korean Incident,

eight months after Marshall cited obvious external Incentive*
for defense, possibly qualifies as a fortuitous and fortunate
event allowing an Improbable period of partial conversion
from a civilian to a military economy commensurate with the
need* of the Ration since 1945«

More dismally, even this

happy picture may fade because the probability appears large
that this partial conversion will be discontinued expllcably
by unfortunate events, such as temporary Soviet passivity,
which will assist a wishful return to normalcy, Impossible for
this Nation to deny.
This awareness of the Navy and the other armed forces
about the political Impossibility of demanding the necessary
sacrifices for a correct economic approach to the problem of
defense, except with the help of a fortune not bestowed
Indigenously, was perhaps buttressed by the fact that some
historical evidence exists to indicate the psychological
unpreparedness of the United states for the sacrifices
required of a world leader.

Power came to the Nation too

easily end too quietly without a necessary leavening of
"blood, sweat, and tears."

The people of the United States

^^House 1949 Strategy Hearings, 600.
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and its leaders have never been forced to demonstrate stamina
for continued sacrifice except in the most perfunctory
fashion during rare and short periods of unusual stress, more
than obvious to all, which even at their worst have still
tested only small segments of the collective will.

This

idyllic state of affairs, historically unique among the
great powers, has failed to provide the events, tradition, or,
more rationally, indoctrination necessary in preconditioning
the individual end collective wills of the Nation for sustained
sacrifice.

Cheap lessons of temporary trial have been soon

forgotten.

This forgetfulness bodes ill for maintaining the

predominant position of the United States when faced with
the costly, lengthy ordeal of uneasy, partial peace required
to prevent, or to meet, successfully the supreme test of
total war with the soviet Union.

As was intimated previously

in the criteria of Chapter I, all elements of ultimate power
are worthless without the will to match the final ends with
the necessary intermediate means,

without other elements,

will alone may not prevail, yet without will, other elements
of power wither and waste away.
A profound critic. General George Marshall, has
blamed this frail reed of the Nation's collective will as the
culprit responsible for the insolvable problems of security,
of which the internal dissensions of the Department of Defense
were only a partial manifestation.

After speaking of the

Nation's will inspired by the adrenalin of war in contrast to
the sad decline of public opinion toward necessary defense

-62"
la time of pomoe, Marshall explained why this deoay of will
warn the primary reason for strong, oantrallzed oontrol by
ths Secretary of Defease, which frustrated differences
unamenable to austere placatlon, rather than for a better
organization based on the Intelligent compromises possible
with adequate means.

In reminiscences on the evolution of

the military establishment since 1945, which were designed
to ausuage the wounds of the Navy and the Department of
Defense caused by the heat of controversy in 1949, Marshall
pinpointed the basic issue, the collective will or public
opinion, as follows:
. . . So I have always felt that the organization
should be built to meet that issue more than merely
what is the best organization, when you go to war,
because you can find your compromises then under the
great outpouring of patriotic effort on the part of
everybody.
I felt ail along there hadn't been enough emphasis
given to that phase of the matter, I felt particular
ly here in the past two or three years that we have
been misled as to the workability of what we are
doing In some respects by the fact that we have a great
stimulant toward military appropriations which I hope
In due time will be completely lacking— that Is our
feelings regarding the Soviet Union* When that
lapses and we do get to a better accord, then, Im
mediately the military forces are in great difficul
ties to maintain themselves at a reasonable state
of efficiency and a reasonable state to provide for
prompt expansion.
Now, my associates who differed with me did so,
I felt, largely on the ground that they thought
America had learned its lesson, when it comes to
appropriations in piping times of peace, I don't
think America will ever learn its lesson, because the
political pressures are tremendous. In the next
place, my associates haven't lived through the
education I had had in the 19^0'* and the immediate
problems I had inherited In 1938, 1939, and 1940,

-
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vhen o m degree of poverty was very tryliig, I
eould well uaderstaad that, They ju&t thought I
uadereatljnated public opinion in the United States.
Well, I am a great respecter of public opinion,
but, on the other hand, I em also a great respecter
of the tremendous political influence of the budget
and the fact that it almost gets beyond control when
it relates to things that do not produce immediate
results like good roads, agriculture matters, and

auch.1%
following this veiled tribute to the gluttony of political
pork in contrast to the starvation of Tommy Atkins at the
Oongressional banquet table, Marshall continued;
So 1 was all the more Interested in seeing some
form of unification adopted which would work. And
that, of course, as you all well know better than
I do because you have been sitting in with it and
I have not— '1 hunt for peaceful quarters these days—
is a very difficult thing.
All of this resolves itself, in my mind, to this;
What we ere striving for is the security of our
country, the security of its Influence in the world,
because we cen*t evade the fact that et the present time
it is the leading nation of the world, wnat we have
to consider along with that is how we manege to meet
the situation without finw&cial tribulations result
ing from it. That means several things. It means,
I think, in the first place, that we have to, out of
the cleverness of somebody's mind or the vision of
somebody's mind, find more economical ways of doing
some of these things that must be done. It also
means very definitely that the money that we are
given must be spent with greet discretion. There you
have the root of your trouble, how is that to be

managed?^"
Hoover had previously answered this question with his
remedy for curing an alleged 10 per cent operational waste
in the military establishment, an estimate renhered suspect,
at least in pert, by either fraudulent, dubious, or, at
'ibid.. 600-602.
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Harebell sought?
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Was that the answer George

He dia not ohoose to say directly he-

amuse, by the time he spoke, the tools for head*knooklmg
eeohomy had not only been provided, but head-knooklng
hands had twisted the helm of the military establishment
even earlier.

Nevertheless, Marshall stood almost alone

In fearlessly feeing the dilemma of whether America would
ever have the will to deny political pressures In assuming
a defense posture worthy of survival. Moreover, Marshall,
without a fruitless clarion call, simply Invited attention
to the hopelessness of the military position within the
inevitable political milieu.
AS Chief of gtaff of the Army in world War II,
Marshall had been duly grateful that military appropria
tions had not hamstrung victorious war operations, in spite
of the fact that the Initial «degree of poverty was very
trying."

As a postwar diplomat and secretary of state,

Marshall did not appear surprised. In view of his previous
experiences between the World wars, that the price of force
required In support of diplomacy, even allegedly poor
diplomacy, was grievously Ignored in sustaining and
evaluating his efforts, especially in China, where, in
return for fifty billion dollars annually, an American
Army of two million men, and half a million casualties,
the United states, at best, would still be policing and
fighting with no reward in sight.

Instead, probably m>re

«

65 ~

*e?*re peaeltle# *oui& already be Impoeed du# to complete
helpleaeaeee elsewhere,

obviously, such a price was ami

le not worth paying In China, contrary to the eenae of certain element# of the Eightieth Congress and its holdover#,
who appeared and appear to want presumably more aavory,
but impossible, results at no appreciable cost.

Neverthe

less, in spite of the "hunt for peaceful quarters,"
Marshall was yet to wear another thorny hat, that of
secretary of Defense, during the Korean incident, also
«whan our degree of poverty was very trying."
Still, Marshall, like Pershing and many others
in the armed forces, could still bear his cross with
loyal honor and confine his pent feelings, while still in
the pay of the government as a General of the Army, to a
mere aside, brought out under Congressional questioning,
which, in its alarm during the month after disclosure of
presumed soviet atomic capabilities, inquired about the
dubious ixeoutive budget restrictions.

In reply, Marshall

said:
The best comment I think I could make on
that is that my original conception of the working
of this unity was that it was desirable that the
Congress, in the law, require once a year a report
by the Chiefs of Staff on the requirements for the
national defense.
Mr. stimson and I had long discussions on
that because I felt that that should be made
entirely outside of, we will say, civilian control.
It is only a statement and nothing more. Now the
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minute euoh » statement Is mad# It would them
pas* into, w# will say, the control of the o l f H
power# of the dovernaeat* , . *1
After more of his tsotful evasion of nasty word#, perhaps
more appropriate than the one# qualified by *we will
say," Marshall finally oame to the point where he had no
ehoioe without obscuring hi# meaning;
There was quite a bit of difference between
Mr. atlmeon and myself. He was such a wise
ohap that I was very hesitant about opposing
hie views. But what I was after wcs that
period la time of peace when It is very diffi
cult to get a correct expression from the
military authorities so long as the expression
is controlled politically** before it is
rendered.' '
speaking very Intimately, I saw General
Pershing in the position where his views didn't
count at ell. He could never get them up for
consideration. And yet he was a man of great
prestige In this country. But the cuts and
cuts and cuts came despite what he felt* The
main reason for this was that he had no opportunity
to give public expression without being in the
position of disloyalty* of course, he never
would have done that.*^
This effort by Marshall, to raise the political
curtain concealing realistic defense estimates had, of
course, never been realized nor was It to be.

Also, doubt

exists as to whether the unveiling of reality would have
had any significant result since the fundamental cause of

2*%bld., 604

2X

Italics not In original,
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House 1949 Strategy Hearings, 604*

-67aefiolenoles, what the traffle of publie opinion
would bear in the way of aaerifiee without the exletenee
of overwhelming emotional pressures not readily produced
rationally and indigenously in the Dnited 8tatea, would
still have thwarted even the most reasoned approaoh to
mass education on defense neoessities.

Beverthelesa, Marshall

had produced the most honest and convincing picture of 1949
about the defense dilemma.

CHAPTER V
THE NAVT RHWa AMOK

• . » We of greater age, and, we hope, more
mature judgment are fearful that the country is
being, if it haa not already been, mold a false
bill of goods.— Vice Admiral Gerald Bogan*
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ian opportunism.
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In contrast to Marshall, the Hairy played a

low, MacArthurian role in that fateful year.

The Havy, with

loud trumpeting, evaded the basic problems so ably stated by
Marshall and deviously compounded confusion by willful dis
regard for constituted authority backed by legislative sanc
tion.

The naval maneuvers of 1949 cast grave discredit on

the Havy and mntrasted markedly with its previously meri
torious efforts to prevent damage to the Ration by Executive
fiat that usurped prerogatives which only Congress could as
sign by law.

With the door closed to politically tenable

methods for further constructive assistance to the Congress
in discharging its unique responsibility "to make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces,"
as demanded in part by Section 8, Article I, of the Constitu^Letter from AdmixttlBogan to Secretary Matthews, 20
September 1949, cited in full by Anav and Havv Journal. 8
October 1949.-------------------------

mè$m

tion, the Navy was forced to let this front fall by default,
while the oonstrictlve recommendations of the Hoover Commis
sion were ultimately passed by Congress without appreciable

change and became law on 10 August 1 9 4 9 However, with
adroit political opportunism, the Navy used other events in
1949 for dramatising its own impoverished role In national
defense, but selfishly neglected or disparaged the vital
functions performed separately or as a team by its associate
armed forces, which had also been cut to the bone, and
flagrantly flaunted the rule of the armed forces by law that

the Navy had previously so ably helped Congress establish in
order to rationalise control of the military establishment*

Because the budgetary and appropriation restrictions
had forced the Nation*a ar%ed forces into unbalanced weakness
that was politically irredeemable without the

mat

grotesque

and inadvertent collaboration of the SoViet Bnion or the uncontilled blundering of a Soviet satellite, the Navy now
chose to isyose its own unilateral conception of grand strate
gy on the Nation in opposition to legal authority in such a
manner as to reconcile the defense unbalance with continued
strength for the Navy.

With the passing of forrestal, the

political opportunity for presenting the potentially more
disastrous alternative of the Navy was soon in coming.
The die for emphasis on the sledge hammer of power,
item in the A g i M i # v y

1949.

D

August

-70strategic air, in contrast to balanced forces, had, of course,
already been oaat.^

The president, perhaps impressed by the

air tonnages being flown to Berlin and the deceptive quiet
elsewhere except for the China morass, which he correctly did
not choose to get bogged down in, remained adamant for a
ceiling of fifteen billion dollars a year, presumably a new
level of defense expenditure brought about by the crisis of
Czechoslovakia and Berlin earlier in 19t f , but this in actu
ality failed even to replace depreciated end obsolescent
inventory carry-overs in equipment from World war II that had
previously strengthened deficiencies of the armed forces in
appropriations.

on 9

December

1948,

the quandary the Joint

Chiefs of staff had faced in not being able to meet their
assigned missions was presented to the President with no
avail.

At that time forrestal had begged for two billion

more in contrast to the rock-bottom estimate of nine billion
additional the Joint Chiefs had required after slicing their
best service experts from a fifteen billion increase,

for-

restal, at last, saw that strategic air power and the atom
had to be the sole reliance of the Nation, supported only by
the minimum aid from the other armed services necessary for
the limited air offensive from England*

With the Air force

taking cuts from its minimum estimate of seventy groups to
forty-eight even to meet this reduced defense objective and
with the tenability of England doubtful due to the forfeit
^Supra. 50-52.
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of the European penlaeula assured by limited American capa
bilities» Forrestal demonstrated increasing sympathy for the
one offensive arm remaining.

On 20 December, he pleaded

again with the President for seven hundred million dollars
for the weapon of last resort, the intercontinental bomber,
which might be the only damaging weapon left in the event of
all-out war.

Instead of this requested increase, the defense

budget was fwrtWr dented by another three hundred million
dollar out when the President transmitted it to Congress on
10 January 1949*^

Bead-knocking hands at the helm. The tragic reper
cussions to defense deficiencies fell with fury on the capable
and strong ahoulders of Louis Johnson, who succeeded Forrestal

as Secretary of Defense.

Bead-knocking was the only choice

he had in bringing some order out of the chaos created by his
Commander in Chief, and head-knocking he loyally did without
quarter or equivocation.

Because of the upward fluctuation

in defense spending at the start of Fiscal Tear 1949, caused
by the temporary panic of the President and the Congress as
a result of the Csech and Berlin crises, Johnson now had to
cut this rate of expenditure in order to enter Fiscal Tear
1950, beginning in July 1949, in systematic fashion, if the
rate imposed by the President for the new year, ending with
the Korean incident, were to be met.

Also Johnson had his

sights set on Hoover's goal of approximately thirteen billion
^Forrestal, 510, 535-53#.
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â&Xlars anmuaXXy» whioh w&s receiving universal acclaim on
Capital Hi XX as the reward for favoring the proposed amend
ments to the unification act of X947*^
A juicy, fat pXum, waiting to be plucked, %m# the
Havy’s supercarrier, now only a keel, but soon to require a
steady replenishments of jets and medium bombers, purportedly
competing with instead of complementing the Air Force.

Less

than a month after taking office, on 23 April 1949, Johnson

directed cancellation of the carrier* s construction.

Secre

tary of the lavy John L. Sullivan, shorn Forrestal had left
capably defending naval interests since 1947, had already

chosen to resign on 24 March after Johnson's threat that the
entering Secretary of Defense would be forced to have him re
moved for disloyalty,

ifow, still in office on 26 April due

to a replacement lag, Sullivan fancifully postdated his
original letter, which was to remain concealed in the Presi
dent's files for six awnre months, by bringing it fictitiously
current in a supplementary letter of resignation to Johnson,
publically blasting him for administrative defiance of the
will of the President, the Congress, and tl» îfavy.^ Was this
the political opportunity the Wavy was waiting for to press
their new strategic theories?

Any rmval optimism for a

Congressional investigation was shattered that same day wh&n
^House 1949 Strategy Hearings, 624-625.
6j&id., 622-623.

&eprem*Btatlve Carl Vlnaon, Democrat of Georgia, Chairman
of the House Armed Services Committee, and valiant ally of
the Navy for many years as former head of the old Haval
Affairs Committee, showed that even he had been hypnotised
by Hoover's siren song for economy.

In an impassioned burst

of Georgian eloquence, Vinson declaimed on #ie House floori

Mr. Speaker, last Saturday the Honorable Louis
Johnson, Secretary of Defense, made a courageoiai
and a momentous decision. He ordered the termina
tion of the construction of the 65,000 ton so-called
supercarrier.
In years past I helped build a two-ocean Havy.
I am proud to think that was correct for we need a
two-ocean Havy to fight any war that comes.
How we know that If war should ever come again
It will be a struggle with a land power.
It is simply a matter of the proper allocation

of war missions between the Havy and the Air Force.
It Is the business of the Air Force to use
long-range boadiers In time of war. And yet, this
carrier was to accommodate su# long-range bombers.
We cannot afford the luxury of two strategic
air forces. We cannot afford an experimental ves
sel that, even without its aircraft, costs as much
as 60 1-36 bombers.
We should reserve strategic air warfare to the
Air Force.
And we should reserve to the Havy Its historic
role of controlling the seas. I do not now— and I
never will— advocate depreciation of our Havy.
Secretary Johnson is to be commended for the
nature of his decision and for moving promptly to
resolve this important matter.7

The door had slamawd again.

However, Vinson, in a

previous statement to the press, attempting to free Johnson

of the sniping of quasl-offlclal prof essional journals and
unauthorized press releases, left one despicable Ingress to
the formwr welcoming legislative font.

621*

This dubious

invitation reads
Armed Services Committee want it clearly
understood that if persons in the armed services
or in their employ continue to pass statements to
the press which are calculated to depreciate the
activities of a sister service and which, at the
s a w time, jeopardise the national security, the
committee will step in with a full-scale investigation^ Me will not tolerate the continuance of
this practice,*
An opportunist qualifies

agisi opoortunism.

At

least one person in the employ of the lavy seemed to welcome
Vinson* s encouraging word about the happy result to be expect
ed from increased propaganda production.

Rapidly, the Kavy

Department appeared to overtake and perhaps even to excel the
Air Force in the leaking of security information mixed with
falsehoods and innuendo.

At this time, the only active sieve,

according to later investigation, was Cedric Worth, an ably
qualified man for this particular task.
cluded a wide range of facile penmanship.

His experience in
He had supplemented

a generation of itinerant newspaper experience, self-training
of a high quality in all but ethics, with even more versatile
writing of movie scenarios and mystery books, including The
Trail of the Serpent and The Corpse That Knew Everybody.

How

ever, his paramount journalistic jewel was won as a ghost
writer for "Alf" Landon, even though his authorship of "Out
of the Rocks with Landon and Knox" was not substantiated.
In spite of Worth*s indubitable talent as a civilian

^Ibid.. 612.
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journalist, Pate had been most unkind to him, in keeping him
from the summit of his profession, until the Navy, in marked

contrast to the blindness of civilian oontemporaries, boosted
him rapidly during World War II from a humble lieutenant,
writing ship-sinking obituaries for naval public relations
in New York City, to the exalted rank of commander on Consti
tution Avenue, Washington.

There, one of his primary duties

was to translate the security-hampered and brass-bound
strategic decisions and naval tactics of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral King, into acceptable form for release
to an eagerly awaiting public.
A fitting reward for his consummate skill in this
duty quickly followed his separation from active naval ser

vice when, in November of 1946, that apogee of power in civil
service, the anonymous role of special assistant to political
appointees, was thrust upon him by a grateful Navy.

However,

only a pitiful pittance of eighty-five hundred dollars an
nually as monetary incentive was included.

Nevertheless,

t W power potential of his new position, unpretentiously
titled Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy for Air, should have Impressed Worth and unquestionably
did, because special assistants at this level in the execu
tive departments wield tremendous influence, particularly
when they can carry weak Presidential appointees on their

shoulders.

In any event, special assistants serve a very

important and necessary function, which, to paraphrase a

crude expression of naval humor, is primarily to keep the
naked Ignorance of their superiors from Indecent official or
public display.

Cedric Worth, in a more refined understate

ment, intimated that he had been recruited as a naval civil
ian employee because a new, unindoctrinated, Assistant
Secretary

. * was very badly in need of someone who under

stood Navy procedures and administration, . . ."9
By the time Vinson had promised his investigation if
leaks continued to the press, Worth had cl imbed another rung
of the bureaucratic ladder, and was then an executive assist
ant to the Vnder Secretary of the Navy, Dan Kimball, another
new appointee in the kaleidoscope of transitory faces in the
Department of Defease.

Kimball was also impressed by Worth's

capabilities in providing painless recruit training in naval
lore.

In this position, as earlier with the Assistant Secre

tary for Air, Worth had duties that required an Intimate
knowledge of the top security data of national defense, in
cluding controversial aircraft performance characteristics
and other items bouncing around the Department of Defense in
the Navy-Air Force feud,^®
the alleged nefarious conspiracy.

Combining his

newly acquired technical knowledge with his previous skill in
^Committee on Armed Services, House of RepresentsInvestigation.
*25, 614, 554, 557.

Immglmatlve writing. Worth fabricated an anoayoous document
of half-truths and lies, the gist of which warn the allega
tion that a nefarious conspiracy existed between tecretary
of Defense Johnson, Secretary of the Air Force Symington,
and Floyd Wl%m, of Consolidated Aircraft and Atlas Corpora

tions, to take over control of the Defense Department and
pour the major part of the American defense effort into an
obsolescent heavy bomber, the B-36.

This detailed and re

dundant coi^ilation of purported facts supporting Worth's
main thesis was introduced by the following preamble, which

set the teneur of the %diole dociment;
The questions raised by this compilation of
information are not directed at air power. The
discussion of machines is incidental, and is in
cluded only to Illuminate the conduct of men who
have at their disposal Immense sums of public
moneys.
A sad lesson of history is that whenever money
in such quantities is available, there appear men
of a certain kind determined to obtain it by any
means. It is nearly but not quite possible to
cover all tracks in pursuit of this end. As the
course of events becomes evident, honest men are
afflicted with sham», and are reluctant to push
the mess into light. There is a tendency to draw
back, to hope that change will occur without
scandal. However, there arrives a recognisable
moment When unscrupulous men become overconfident
and create circumstances that are intolerable.
They may then be eliminated. That moment is close
at hand with relation to the efforts of the Atlas
Corp. to take over the Rational Defense Establish
ment,
Many of the impartant facts in this story have
been published. But the reference of these facts
to each other has been obscured by a cloud of con
fusion skillfully induced through fanciful and fas
cinating tub-thumping in the naaw of air power.
This brief compilation is not evidence* It brings
the pictyre into focus and indicates matters ripe
for investigation. It is not complete. Any

which are net desonetrahie fact are

eo indicated. 13.
At last, the Navy regained the interest of Congress.
Worth circulated his docuiraint to numerous figures on Capitol
Hill; including Representative Van Zandt, Republican from
Pennsylvania, Captain in the Naval Reserve, and Past National
Gommnder of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

This recipient,

triply fit as an exponent of national defense, particularly
the naval view, viciously paraphrased Worth's document in a
speech to the House of Representatives on 26 May 1949*

Full

scale, formal hearings on the allegations, with the assist
ance of well-Qualified legal counsel, specially hired, were
assigned by the House to the Committee on Armed Services
early in June.

After an assiduous period of preliminary in

vestigation, the hearings began on 9 August 1949.3-^
Fraud exposed. But, alas, the Navy, even yet, was
not invited to give its unilateral view on grand strategy.
Instead the Department of Defense and the Air Force succeeded
in getting the falsehoods corrected with the help of nearly
all the major aircraft producers competing with Odium of Con
solidated, except a disgruntled Glenn Martin.

He had appar

ently collaborated in a juicy tidbit to the Worth document.
This alleged that the Emerson Electric Company of Symington,
prior to Symington's severance from industry to enter governlllbid.. 15-20.
1-15.
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«#rvio#, had attempted with Air force eoanivaace to take

over Martin*8 contract for tmrreta during World War II.
In contrast to the splendid performance of its
enemies, the Wavy was limited to two tragic characters.
Worth*a chastened student, Wavy Wnder Secretary Kimhall, indi-

cated with chagrin that confidence in his capable tutor had
been "painfully c h a n g e d . In extenuation of his own deplor
able conduct, Cedric Worth could only say, on 24 Augusts

I was greatly concerned. As the document
indicates, It appears to me that the defenses of
the country are going in the wrong direction and
are being materially weakened by propaganda which
is not true,15
However, Worth manfully agreed the next day with the question
of the comdLttee counsels
And you realise that at least the United States
Government is fwtunate in having forthright and
honorable men in charge of its procurement of,air

craft and in the operation of the air force?!®
Ohaixmian Viwon irrevocably closed this particular
phase of the naval tragedy with unanimous expression of the
sentiment of his committees

There has not been, in my judgment, and I
satisfied in the judgment of the entire committee,
one iota, not one scintilla of evidence offered
thus far in these hearings that would support charges
that collusion, fraud, corn#tion, influence, or
favoritism played any part whatsoever in the pro
curement of the B-36 bomber.
There has been very substantial and compelling
evidence that the Air Force selected this boriber,
O lhld.. 17, 615.
Ul b i d .■ 614.
527.
653.

procured this bomber solely on the ground that this
is the beet aircraft for its purpose available to
the Nation today.
At this time I feel that the Nation should know
that the Secretary of the Air, Mr, Symington, and
the leaders of the Air Force, the Secretary of De
fense, have come through this inquiry without the
slightest blemish and that these men continue
to
merit the complete confidence of
the American
people
in their past action and in the future#17
Another naval martvr.

The Congressional door previ

ously left ajar by Vinson was slowly closing again on the

Navy,

Would another martyr in the naval

though Cedric Worth* s direct charges

cause appear? Al

had all been

foundfalse,

there still remained a bone for biased contention and judg
ment on the subject of the strategic policy dictated by
limited military appropriations.

While Vinson*a Committee

suspended hearings from 25 August to 5 October and a naval
court of inquiry sat, both were confirming Cedric’s desire
for final formal walking papers from his meteoric naval
c a r e e r , The tiiw for an even more spectacular martyrdom
had definitely arrived If this placid interlude were to be
tempestously stirred into the Navy’s last chance for an ef
fective hearing on its unique strategic theories.

The burden

of this sacrifice was voltmtarily assumed by a top-flight
naval aviator. Captain John Crommelln, imminently due for am

assured promotion to rear admiral.

Crommelln released a long,

involved statement to the press in violation of defense
17ibid,. 654-655.

659.
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information rule# in mid-September.

Hie etetemeot had been

originally prepared for the B-)6 inquiry, but he now feared
that this press release was the only way to save his cogent
remarks for posterity since the Congressional hearings had
cooled to a simmer.

Crommelln finally brought the naval

grievances over the recently passed amendments to the unifi
cation act, called the Tydings Bill, into the open with ful
some praise of Worth*s objectives, regardless of his methods,
which drooled, in part;
It is my firm conviction that Cedric Worth
was prompted by the highest motives of patriotism
and selflessness in whatever action he took to
help ggint out the dangers of the original Tydings
Crommelln, a member of the Joint Staff to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, had probably assisted Worth by furnishing raw in
formation, but Worth* s unique pride of authorship and dis
sémination of his scurrilous defamation remained unchallenged.
HevertWless, Crommelln had discussed the memorandum with
Worth and been an accessory before the fact in suggesting
that Worth* s research mig#t be of value, if released to the
press, in getting a B-36 inquiry started on Capitol Hill in
what Grommelin hoped would be an entering wedge for explana
tion of the Navy* s opposition to additional concentration of
power in the Department of Defense.20
Fleet Admiral “Bull” Halsey and a couple of low19gews item in the Armv and M a w Journal. 17 Sept.

1949.
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ranklag r m r admiral* still on active service jumped into
the fray at once, with the "Bull* bellowing:
Having read Captain Crommelln*s statement#
and comments, I feel very strongly that he is
attempting to do something ^ o d for the country
and that he has shown wonderful courage in
jeopardising his career by doing this. I feel
that he deserves the help and respect of all
naval officers,21

Control of the rowboat lost. The tide was rolling
in, but Secretary of Havy Matthews, of possibly apocryphal
«rowboat" fame, who had succeeded Sullivan, vainly tried to
stem it into channels by encouraging both the proper subordi
nation and the free expression of naval misgivings.

In a

dispatch to all naval commanders following Crommelln*s defec

tion, they and their subordinates were encouraged to transmit
their views to Matthews, who promised, «The views so trans

mitted will I assure you be used in support of the intep*ity
and efficiency of the Naval

s e r v i c e . «22

Matthews was being

greatly embarrassed by those undisciplined sailors traducing
the Air force and the Department of Defense in full public

view.
Crommelln had been transferred to what Matthews
thought was a less sensitive position than the Joint Staff,
to directly under his thumb in the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations.
21 ^ 2 2 ,

The command dispatch of Matthews now set

cit.

22ibld,. 24 September 1949.

Cromm#lin up for a uiahful oouo do graeo for tbo whole wicked

world of intrigue against his beloved Navy.

Apparently

Gremmalln scrutinised the Secretary's mall, at least that

portion which passed through the office of Admiral Benfield,
Chief of Naval Operations, the top naval job under the civil

ian hierarchy.

In compliance with the directive of l&tthews

to keep embarrassing views in official naval channels, Vice
Admiral Gerald Bogan, commander of a principal unit of the

Pacific Fleet, made a well-disciplined and sailorly effort to
put his civilian chief straight on what was wrong with defense
and the

N a v y , 2#

How proud Crommelln must have been to read these
emtraets from Bogan's letter, written on 20 Geptmsber 1949»
three days before the President's Soviet atomic disclosure:
At the beginning it is proper for me to state
that in no manner have I, to date, endorsed or con
demned Captain Crommlin's statement because no one
has asked me to do so. Had such been the case honest

necessity and conscience would have required hearty
and complete agreement with the affirmations made
in his release to or interview with the press.
The creation of three departments or sub depart
ments where formerly there were but two la not uni
fication. Under the present law it can be m d e to
and does operate effectively in the field. But it
would be sheer balderda#: to assume that there has
been anything approaching it among the Secretariat,
the Joint Staff, or the hi#i eonand of all three
services. Knowing that honest differences of opin
ion must constantly be present, bickering is still
the rule; unanimity is non-existent.
The morale of the Navy is lower today than at
any time since I enteredklthe commissioned ranks in
19i6. Lowered morale, to some degree, may be ex
pected to follow any war during the readjustment
23Letter reproduced in Ibid.. 6 October 1949*

to the organitetion for peace* In my opinion
this descent, almost to despondency, stems from
complete confusion as to the future role of the
Navy and Its advantages or disadvantages as a
permanent career.
Optimistic letters and plans issue from
Washington, And concurrently the situation de
teriorates with each press release. The younger
men are necessarily concerned with their future
security. We of greater age, and, we hope, more
smture judgment are fearful that the country is
being, if it has not already been, sold a false
bill of goods.
Junior officers in large numbers, whose con
fidence I enjoy, have comm to see me asking advice
on their future course of action. I have invari
ably encouraged them to enhance their professional
ability against the day when the troiAlesome ques
tions now paramount would be equably resolved.
It is becwaingIncreasingly difficult for #e to do
this honestly. 24
Thus far, all his comrades in arms

from every

fighting

service, including the civilian reserve, could rally around
Bogan and cry, "Ament " with an added prayer that their mun-

trymen would shed their collective guilt and provide the
mecps to proper ends.

But now Bogan cited the paradox of

defense without weapons, strength without sacrifice, and
miracles without money, which had baffled the best.

Further

more, he supinely accepted the dilemma while implying that
the Navy and the Havy alone could produce a miracle*

This

paradox was resolved thus*
If the adequate military or defense establish
ment could be achieved without a navy and naval
aviation, I would gladly advocate using funds now
expended to maintain that service, on ^ e procure
ment of the best other necessary weapons and equip
ment. Hot even the United States can support
Mt.

indefinitely; during pence* the tragically
large military budget a we are devouring, 2)
Balderdaeh, indeed:

Was this the first announcMmat of the

Navy* a new strategic theory of adequate force unbalanced in
favor of the Navy?

In a more statesmanlike way, Bogan lashed

out at the sledge hammer of

power, the strategicair force,

which did look rather silly

inthe tool kit with nosupple

ments;
There is no cheap quick victory possible
between any two nations orgroups of nations
each having strong even ifrelatively unequal
power, let at a time as potentially critical
as ever existed during our history, the public
has been lured into complacency by irresponsible
Speeches by advocates of this theory. The re
sult could be a great national and world-wide
catastrophe,20
This masterful understatement was fine, but that tool kit was
going to look even sillier if the Navy ever succeeded in re
placing the sledge hammer with supplemental naval tools, thus
leaving an even greater gap in our arsenal.
Perhaps now the only way to reconcile the Kavy was to
transfer the Air Force to the Kavy and the Army to the Navy’s
Harine Corps.

Apparently, a severe neurosis, ripened by

increasing deficits since World War II and acutely defined by
the shock of carrier loss, had afflicted a large portion of
the Navy.

Unquestionably, this disease required urgent diag

nosis and treatment by the Congress, beneficent healer.

The

organisational strait jacket was killing instead of curing,
^^Loc. cit..

26hoc.
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but the only better remedy, soothing bel® from an open

Gongressionsl puree, would kill the doctors.
psychiatry was the answer.

Perhaps

Would a long, soothing talk

bring order to the havy* s chaotic state of mind?
The purloined letter.

One of the "doctors," Chair

man Vinson, thought this latter treatment mandatory, when
his House Armed Services Committee reconvened, because

Crommelln had publicly advertised, for the first time in an
official Navy document, the sad mental and physical condition

of the Kavy.

The naval flyer passed Bogan's letter to the

press on 4 October 1949, a superlative place of timing, one
day before the advertised date of resuming, and probably con

cluding, the B-36 investigation.

The purloined copies of

the letter were classified confidential, but Grommelin did
not mind the unauthorised disclosure of this damaging infor
mation to the entire world

m

long as the Navy could possibly

take over the grand strategy of the Nation,

His words in

cluded*

I consider
release of the letter of Vice
Admiral Bogan with the endorsements of Admirals
Radford and Denfield necessary to the interests
of national security.27
Indeed, both the Commander of the Pacific Fleet and the Chief
of Naval Operations had also confirmed in substance the views
of Bogan, adding increased prestige to Crommelln's

coup.

The aviator continued, "My action in this vital matter may
2 7 N0 WS

item in Ibid.. Ô October

1949.

•ô?"*
have beam a teehnioal violation of a regulation, but it had
to be done.*2i

2^L0G.

sÂk*

GHAPTSa VI
BELLOIgS FOR B-36 3 0 3 8 6
* . . the publie hearing of the grlevaneee of
a few officers • . . and chargea as to our poor . . .
preparedness, have done Infinite harm to our
national defense, our position of leadership In
world affairs, the position of our national
policy, and the confidence of the people In our
government.--General of the Army omar N* Bradley**'
Congress fans the embers.

The B-36 investigation

was closed all right, just as the Navy had feared It would
be, before the Navy had its day in court.

Nevertheless,

Grommelin had blown a hole in the door of Congress through
which not only the Navy, but the entire Defense Department
poured.

On 5 October, after closing the Investigation of

the false charges of worth and Van Zandt, Vinson obtained
approval from his committee to broaden new hearings into a
scrutiny of all aspects of unification and strategy within
the Department of Defense.

Grommelin*s hole, as described

in part by Vinson, was indeed huge, because Vinson promised:
to ascertain the views of representatives of the
Navy and. If necessary, the other services, on
those developments in the Department and on such of the
items of the original agenda to which they may care
to refer.4
% o u s e 1949 Strategy Hearings, 536-537*
^House 1949 B-36 Investigation, 660-661.
-
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fil© meat âay, 6 0© to ber 1949, Chairman flnsoa opened
the hearings on unification and strategy with a clear state
ment of the ultimate responsibility of Congress end the
Bouse Armed services committee for the deplorable conditions
in the Department of Defense.

In unequivocal language he

described how the action's abscess of collective guilt for
this situation came to a festering head in Congress:
Under the Constitution, the Congress is given the
responsibility for providing and maintaining a navy
and for raising and supporting an army.
This responsibility cannot be delegated by the
Congress, so until and unless the constitution is
amended otherwise, the Congress of the united states
cannot divorce itself of responsibility for providing
for the armed strength of the Nation*
Now, members of the committee, under the rules
of the House, as you all know, this Committee on Armed
Services is charged, among other things with the
following matters:
{1\ Common defense generally;
(2) the ?*ar Department and the Military Establishment
generally; (3) the Navy Department and the Naval
Establishment generally; (4) size and composition
of the Army and the Navy; (g) forts, arsenals,
military reservations, and navy yards.'*
Over two years had passed since Congress had made this word
ing obsolete, but presumably the Department of Defense and
the United states Air Force were born from this conglomera
tion and were also subject to the purview of the committee*
Vinson continued:
The House Rules go on to say as follows:
• • , each standing committee of the Senate and
House of Representatives shall exercise continuous
watchfulness of the execution by the administrative
agency concerned of any lews, the subject matter of
which is within the jurisdiction of such committee . . .
so this committee has the responsibility which
cannot be delegated to maintain legislative oversight

^House 1949 strategy Hearings, 1.

-90of the military dapartmeats la order to see that the
reaponslhllltles imposed upon the Congress by the
Constitution are properly carried o u t , *
After this fine start, Vinson lost his footing and
fell into rather soft ground by scoffing at the effect of the
Croaaelin incident on his end the committee's action.

In

Vinson's eordsi
?or these reasons this committee determined 4
months ago to conduct the inquiry commencing this
morning. The committee felt last June, and recent
events have confirmed that view, that there have been
sufficient concern and so much obvious disagreement
within the Department of Defense, end that these
disagreements involve such basic subjects affecting
the national defense, that this committee could not
properly ignore the situation,
80 this hearing this morning is pursuant to the
committee's decision of 4 months ago, not— as the
morning press might indicate— the results of events
occurring within the last day or so or the last few
weeks.^
While technically correct, because the original
agenda for the B-36 investigation had included many collat
eral matters, Vinson's committee had dragged its feet for
four, long, critical months, on the minor diversion of the
Van Zandt and Worth charges of criminal acts in high circles,
without displaying further interest in basic causes for
dissension in the military establishment,

certainly,

Orommelin's action was one of last resort to Inspire further
interest in hearings that were about to fold up.
Loo.

Pit.

1-2 ,

Under the
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orlëiael Houee reeolatloa &utWri&ln& a foim&l inquiry,
only tiwo pertinent 1terne he& been on the agenda.

Tbeee were:

1. TO eetabiieh the truth or falsity of ail
charge# made by Mr. Van Zandt and by all other# th#
committee may find or develop in the investigation.
2. Locate and identify the source from which the
chargee, rumora, and innuendoes have come.^
The other six collateral matter# on the agenda were ones
that, Vinson was now admitting, had always been subject to
the "continuous watchfulness” of hi# committee, which
obviously had fallen down on its job except for sporadic
periods,

how, belatedly, the house

Armed services Oommlttee

was to do its regular job of routine surveillance, which in
this case required a follow up of the previous agenda in
order to:
3. Examine the performance characteristics of
the B-36 bomber to determine whether it is a satis
factory weapon.
4. Examine the role# and mission# of the Air
Force and the Navy (especially the Navy aviation and
Marine aviation) to determine whether or not the
decision to cancel the construction of the aircraft
carrier United States wassound.
5* Isiablish whether or not the Air Force is
concentrating upon strategic bombing to such an extent
as to be injurious to tactical aviation and the
development of adquate fighter aircraft and fighter
aircraft techniques.
6. Consider the procedures followed by the Joint
Chiefs of staff on the development of weapons to be
used by the respective services to determine whether
or not it is proposed that two of the three services
will be permitted to pass on the weapons of the third.
7. Study the effectiveness of strategic bombing
to determine whether the Nation is sound in following
this concept to its present extent.
8. Consider all other matters pertinent to the
above that may be developed during the course of the
Investigation,^
% o u s e 1949 B-30 Investigation, 637.

^Ibld.. 660.
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/Iso, if the undisciplined oonduot of crojamelin had
not exposed the private thoughts of the majority of naval
officers on unification and strategy, it would be fatuous to
assume that the Navy would have been able to do better in a
continued investigation chaperoned by official Department of
Defense policy than It did under similer restrictions during
this same year when a legitimate opportunity for presenting
the naval views occurred during the hearings on the Tydings
amendments to the 1947 unification act.

After all, Congress

ordinarily does not Invite criticism of the law of the land
unless extremely cogent reasons are presented for its open
defiance.

Vinson illustrated the changed atmosphere of the

unification and strategy hearings, brought about by
Orommelln*a decisive stroke, In comparison to previous hear
ings of 1949 on defense matters, which were already in
substance the will of Congress, by issuing this Invitation
for free and frank speech;
I would like to say on behalf of the oommlttee,
although I believe the comment is probably unnecessary,
that it is the Intent of the committee that all testi
mony given shall be frankly and freely given and be
given without reprisals in the Department of Defense
against any individual presenting testimony during the
course of these hearings.
This committee will not permit nor tolerate any
reprisal against any witness in these hearings, nor
will we permit nor tolerate any shepherding of the
testimony being presented, we want these witnesses
to speak what is in their minds, to put their cards
on the table, and to do so without hesitation or per
sonal concern, we are going to the bottom of this
unrest end concern in the Navy. And the committee
expects full cooperation In this effort from the

-93Department of Defense. When the testimony is ell in,
the oommlttee will try to reaoh e deolelon am to what
action le indicated in the interests of national
defense.®
Vinson had no criticism to make later about the
freedom end frankness of the testimony although he and others
became somewhat confused after the hearings were over, about
the subtle distinction between reprisals and mere administra
tive action within the Navy for more loyal organizational
support of unification.

Even the mild remonstrance of

Secretary Matthews was Ignored by Vinson, when Matthews
made this complaint about being too free and frank In open
hearings;
I think that a statement made here can be harmful
to the security of the country even though It doesn’t
contain what might be considered technically classified
material. I think that the whole statement, the nature
of the statement, the effect that it has upon the
National Defense Department and upon the administration
of the Military Establishment of the country, and so
far as it might disclose serious differences of
policy and procedure, can well give to a foreseeable
enemy something which, in my humble judgement, ought
not to be disclosed. That is my position,°
Speaking of Admiral Radford, who was to be master of
ceremonies and set the tenor for the unique navel strategy
to bring more money into the naval coffers, Vinson replied
to Matthew’s plea:
Of course, Mr. Secretary, we are not hunting
headlines, we are trying to do a job. We are trying
to find out what la the cause of all this unrest
that is talked about daily in the newspapers. We want
to know what there is to it. And we are charged by
the rules of the House to find out how the laws that
we have sponsored and passed are being administered.
Now, when we get to Admiral Radford, it may be, in
% o u s e 1949 Strategy Bearings, 2,

^Ibld., 3.
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the laterest of being oautious, that we may deter
mine to have the admiral present it to us in
ezeoutlve session. Then, if we determine that it
is not elassified information in our judgment, we
will release it to the public so the public con
know what is going on.
The country supports the Nation's defense. The
country should be cognizant all the time of every
phase of the defense that can be publicly discussed.
That is one of the reasons for this investigation
After hearing Admiral Radford behind closed doors
the first day of the hearing, the majority of the committee
decided that his statement should be repeated in open
session for public consumption, which he did on 7 October
1949» the following day.

11

Never have so few permitted so

much to be revealed to so many against the national interest.
The leaky naval bellows.

Already the previous B-36

investigation had disclosed that the detailed performance
characteristics of this weapon with the atomic bomb were
superior to other comparable choices immediately available
for production as intercontinental war deterrents and
retaliatory weapons.

The Air Force had been forced to

reveal officially all aspects entering into its bast pro
fessional judgment for choosing the B-36 in order to prove
that this airplane had been honestly procured.

The Committee

on Armed Services, as previously noted, had been compelled
to conclude from this presentation that;
^^Loc. cit.
lllbid., 39.

There has heem very substantial and oompelling
evMenee that the Air foree seleoteé this bomber,
prooureâ this bomber solely on the ground that this
is the best airoraft for its purpose available to
the Matioatoiay.i^
Now, however, the Navy proeeeded to indieate, in
spite of this finding of fast by the eomaittee of the B-36
being *the best airoraft for its purpose,» that it still
did not meet the requirements of modern war when viewed in
the light of the first item of the new agenda adopted by the
commit tee, naiwly, to “examine the performance eharaeteristios of the b-36 bomber to determine whether it is a satisfaotory w e a p o n . R a d f o r d ’s oonolusion, supported by the
entire staff of naval experts aooompanying him, was summed
up as follows5
Are we as a nation to have “bomber generals» fight
ing to preserve the obsolete heavy bomber— the battle
ship of the alr?_ Like its surface counterpart, its day
is largely past.^*
But that day was not quite past, and no substitute sledge
hammer was available if overseas land bases were denied,
even if supercarriers grew overnight.
Instead, the Navy had come to its unilateral concept
of grand military strategy in which not only the 1-36 was
ridiculed as a weapon, but the bizarre theory was advanced
that strategic air warfare, crippling an enemy’s war
^^House 1949 1-36 Investigation, 655.
not in original.
l^Ibld., 660.
^^House 1949 Strategy Hearings, 47.
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potential at the eouree, although useful in the later
stages of a war, was an unwarranted and uneoonomlc expense
in time of peace because it did not contribute to minimum
defense essentials.

The committee could only conclude, in

summarising the R a r y s position, that:
It was the Navy contention that in time of
peace, because of severe limitations on national
defense funds, the Nation can afford to maintain
only those armed forces which will contribute
directly to—
1. The defense of the united states against
air end sea attack,
2. The defense of western Europe against land,
sea, end air attack.
3. The defense and seizure of bases needed for
the initial and later stages of the war.
4. Attack on forces invading western Europe.
5 Oommand of the seas.
The Navy considered an unsupportable luxury all
military weapons and activities which fail in time of
peace to contribute the most to the attainment of
these "first needs."^2

.

After

thus

limiting the initial offensive capabili

ties of the Nation to a bloodletting la western Europe, the
Navy explained the

futility

of strategic bombing capabili

ties in meeting these objectives;
Strategic bombing . . . will not serve any of
these requirements, for the giant, hlgh-altltude
bomber cannot defend the United states, seize or
hold advance bases, defend western Europe,
effectively attack advancing troops in western
Europe, or maintain control of the seas. . . .
Tactical air power rather than strategic air
power, plus ground troops and sea power, are the
only military instrumentalities that cam meet these
^ %ous# Committee on Armed Services Report on
Unification and Strategy, in Army and Navy Journal,
M e i m S t B c I T e l w Soûsê^$%nK17Ication
and Strategy Report*

-97©lemeatary requirements. • . . The Nation is unwisely
investing, in time of peace, substantial sums of
limited defense appropriations for strategic bombing.
The ripping of the bellows♦

.,
'

quite naturally, General

Vendenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air foroe, was somewhat
appalled by this rather extraordinary thesis of the Navy.
Taking the sledge hammer of power out of the defense tool
kit and leaving the Nation only with lesser nuances of power,
desirable though the took and claw hammers were and are, did
not appear to appeal to him at all.

After quoting Winston

Churchill as a somewhat qualified authority on the deterrent
effect of the atomic bomb in contrast to the glib and posi
tive young naval commander who had loosely correlated his
facts as part of the navel effort to belittle atomic
capabilities, Vandenberg listed some of the logical con
sequences of the drastic change in strategic planning
proposed by the Navy:
first, we would give up the deterrent value of
this country’s atomic weapons and we would place our
selves in disagreement with all of those people, on
both sides of the ocean, who believe that Soviet
aggression is, in fact, now being deterred.
Second, we would inform the Russians that they
need now take no defensive measures against a possible
atomic attack on their heartland. Much has been
said here about an enej^ capability of stopping bomber
attacks. . • . The people who have said these things
seem not to realise that the 1-36»s, 1-47»s , and
1-50*8, by merely existing, can, and do, force the
soviet Onion to channel its industrial power, tech
nological skill, manpower, and money into purely
defensive measures and thus out down resources which
could otherwise be devoted to offensive purposes.

^l oe# cit.

-96Third, if war is forcad upon us, this proposal
deprives us of the opportunity of choking off enemy
war-making power at its souree. It bring# it about
that the enemy*# weapons have to be met and destroyed
by our soldiers and tactical airmen while these weapons
are shooting at them* It eliminates the possibility
of destroying these weapons in the production stage
before they can shoot.
Mr. Chairman, this alternative is militarily
unsound. A prime objective of this country must be
to find a counterbalance to the potential enemy’s
masses of ground troops other than equal masses of
American and Allied ground troops. No such balanc
ing factor exists other than strategic bombing, includ
ing the atomic bomb. Only by that method can those
masses of ground troops be weakened at the source of
hostile military power.
Lest this statement be again tortured into a
declaration that strategic bombardment can win a
war alone, let me restate my belief that if a future
war comes ultimately it must be concluded on the
ground, like most wars of iHe past, ^ u f i T ’is Ihe
objective of the strategic bombardment program— an
objective that has been proved in battle— so to
weaken the sustaining sources of enemy troops that they
can be defeated in less time at less cost.17
The question of filling the defense tool kit was
certainly not solved by Vandenberg’s remarks, but the naval
strategy did appear the weaker of the two concepts, provid
ing balanced forces, tailor-made for best maintaining world
stability, could not be provided.

Perhaps General Bradley,

the doughboy and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff,
had a better concept of what should be the goal of team
play among all the armed forces when he warned:
There is a Sunday afternoon within the memory
of all of us when this country was without the means
of striking back from a devastating blow. Nothing
stood between us and fiendish foe but an entirely
^^House 1949 Strategy Hearings, 454-457»
not in original.
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-99Inadequate Air Foroe, a mere handful of Regular
eoldlera plus a few olTlllan oomponent* celled
into Federal aervloe a year before, and the remnants
of what we had considered to be a powerful Eavy.
Never again should this Nation face such a
catastrophe.
Nor must we allow those friendly nations relying upon us for support to place their confidence in
vain,
Americans must never forget the lessons we
learned on that Sunday afternoon,
we would have welcomed then the power to strike
back in retaliation. Had we been capable of retaliat
ing in kind, we could have saved the lives of many
American youth. It would have made no difference
to us then which of the armed forces was capable of
carrying out this job,
probably complete understanding, cooperation, and
mutual trust could have avoided that fatal day. But
it, and the subsequent lessons we learned, day by
day, until September 194f», should have taught all
military men Lhat our military forces are one team—
in the game to win regardless of who carries the ball.
This is no time for "fancy dans" who won’t hit the
line with all they have on every play, unless they
can call the signals, Each player on this team—
whether he shines in the spotlight of the backfield
or eats dirt in the line— must be an all-American,^^
This splendid picture of the objectives unification
could not attain with the means provided, was dimmed by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, when he added, in
rightful Indignation of the MacArthurian conduct of the Navy;
I believe that the public hearing of the griev
ances of a few officers who will not accept the
decision# of the authorities established by law, end
■ cS££âfâ « |£ °S£. i|2£ state of PfePeredpesg. W e e
done Infinite harm t o o u r national defense,our posi
tion of leadership in world affairs, the position of
our national policy, and the confidence of the people
in their Government,
In my opinion, the armed forces all have.a very
big job to do, end we should get on with it.*"
l*Ibid.. 536.
l^Ibid.. 536-537.

Italics not in original.
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ipalon aa to the deplorable atate of th* Nation's defenses,
ehleh had been nakedly exposed by the hearings, but along
with either this naive estimate of soviet Intelligence
capabilities or loyalty to his civilian superiors, who sere
doing their best to confirm the desire of Congress for the
Hoover concept of economy, he also apparently convinced
Chairman Vinson that Congress was fulfilling Its responsi
bilities to the Nation In supporting adequate defenses,

in

a well-deserved tribute to Bradley, Tlnson repeated the
assurance that all was well;
General Bradley, In my opinion you have again
rendered great service to your Nation. This la a force
ful document— a powerful document. I am satisfied
that It will help this oommlttee to clear up the
atmosphere— to get the chaff out of the wheat, and
to reach a right and proper decision. I think you
have lifted much of the mist over this serious situa
tion and have let the country know that we do have
a strong and powerful defense organization, manned
by qualified and competent people. I thank you.*®
famished evidence compounded by the Great gngineer.
Except for Marshall's veiled remarks, cited earlier, about
the futility of balanced military forces due to the collectlve guilt of the American people of expecting strength
without sacrifice, the hearings were completely devoid of
a constructive facing of the two brutal facts that first,
within the limits of Congressional appropriations for defense,
none of the armed forces could do its minimum job as part of
537.
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a single team in assisting world stability, and second, even
the prime deterrent, sir power, had not only grievous limi
tations but had also been hamstrung in effectiveness due to
limited means, even with proper emphasis on its stellar role
in the air age*
Nevertheless, these hearings during two fateful
weeks of October, 1949» little over half a year from a minor
test of the Nation*s total defenses against aggression,
Korea, provided all the evidence available to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and Forrests! a year earlier.
equally clear now.

The dilemma was

Perhaps Congress, having the basic

responsibility for the quandary, could now produce the
miracle, strength without sacrifice,

or then again, perhaps

Congress could only do what the best professional experts
could do in the past and what Representative Lansdale
Sasscer, Democrat of Maryland, had dimly foreseen before the
October hearings got under way.

Among other things, particu

larly his constituents, Sasecer was worried about what
Congress was doing in providing armed forces like;
. . . .a football team developing a strong quarter
back who takes shoes away from the halfback and
pants off the blocking back, and the whole basic
thing is out of line. * . . .
For some rather human reason, probably the seme one that
made the Army the only strong post-world war II advocate of
üniversai Military Training, and American youth desire either

21House 1949 B-36 Investigation, 664.
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to serve In safety or to die with glamour, the Congressman
ahowed proper solicitude for the Air Force, the Navy, and
the Marine Corps, hut bis short-handed haokfleld also looked
unusual and lonesome without a line.
Fruitlessly, the hearings, with their gruesome
portents of disaster, droned to a close on 21 October 1949
Twith a happy note of cheer, beloved by all Congressmen.
Herbert Hoover concluded the hearings with his usual stirring
call for trenchant action, like pulling the covers over his
heed, and forcefully demanded economy as the fighting edge
of the Natlon*a armed forces.

In praising Secretary Johnson**

vigorous scalpel on the Inevitable fat, which unfortunately,
in this case had little muscle under It, Hoover defended
administrative outs of defense monies already appropriated
by Congress.

Absurdly, In some Instances, such as providing

for Impotently pllotless planes that would become obsolete
due to other fund limitations before pilot cadres could be
trained to fly them In an «aergency. Congress had laid Itself
wide open to this accusation by Hoover:
One phase of this economy problem Is the Idea
which has been advanced that administrative officers
should spend the full appropriations of the Congress.
This may well apply to some special desire of the
Congress, but It should not be a general rule.
Otherwise the whole purpose of congressional leglslatlon for economy, such as arose from our committee,
of which I was chairman, would fall to the ground as
absolutely futile, so that In my view Secretary
Johnson has outlined to you the proper organization
to be set up on the economy front. It is. In It
self, evidence of his resolution to bring about
these economies; and, as your committee well knows,
making economies In government receives very little
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praise from the great majority th%t benefit. They
do evoke great disharmonies from those who ere
dlrootly affected; and, for this determination and
the Secretary's willingness to take this punishment,
he Is doing a real public service.
I would like to add one more thought, and that
Is to emphasize the pressures which now erlst upon
our economy. It Is costing us. In one direction or
another, almost 24 billion dollars annually to carry
on the cold war. Already we have a budget deficit
In sight of 5 or 6 billion dollars for this fiscal
year and perhaps more next year. That can mean. If
It continues, only one thing, and that Is Inflation,
which will damage every worker and every farmer In
the United States. In my view our productive economy
Is already so heavily taxed as to slow up progress In
Its Improvement of methods and the necessary expansion
to meet the needs and demands of our Increasing popu
lation. Ro cannot continue such burdens forever, and
the first service is economy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To which the gallant gentleman from Georgia, Carl
Vinson, Southern Democrat, nostalgic for the happy defla
tionary days of less than two decades before, replied with
joyous courtesy at thie answer to all of his committee's
problems:
Thank you, Mr, President. Tour statement will be
of great value to the oommlttee, I am particularly
anxious to have you give to the committee your views,
for In writing our report I wanted your sound judgnumt
to be a guide to assist us.
It la a pleasure, Mr. President, to have you here.
I hope our request hasn't unduly Inconvenienced you.*^
lot to be outdone in compliments, and in fitting

display of just the right degree of modesty to a well-deserved
tribute, the sage of Palo /dto and the Waldorf Towers (where
at that time he dwelled in solitary grandeur without the com
plementing glory of the military henchman of his administration.
^%ouse 1949 Strategy Hearings, 638.
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Douglae MacArthur) aould only reply, amid a etandlng ovatloa,
»It la a greet pleaaure to hare been of help, and It ia the
duty of every citizen to ooeie ehen the oommlttee aeke."^^
Indeed,
applause

slowly

all

the evidence

faded

away

was now

in, and,

as

the

for the elder statesman, the

court*

ly (Georgian, as usual having the last word, repeated, w^hank
you,

President."25 Then, with all the problems of

Mr.

troublous
sense of

modern

urgency

world miraculously washed

away,

our

with all

completely vanished, and with the ratio

of

American atomic superiority diminishing, Vinson owtinued:
Members of the committee, that finishes ail of the
witnesses scheduled by the committee to be heard.
HOW I think the proper thing for us to do Is to take
all this testiittony that has been delivered and read it,
study It, evaluate it, go home and rest, take a little
vacation, get In touch with our constituency, come back
here In January, and try to reach a decision as to what
the course of action we think is important.
I want to say before we leave that Mr. Johnson,
the Secretary of Defense, as stated by President Hoover,
deserves the full support of the committee and the
country in his difficult task.
I think as I suggested a moment ago, when we know
each other a little bit better— tuat Is, the Congress
and the Defense Department and the various services— a
great many of our difficulties will fade away.
Members of the oommlttee, we will take a recess
until the 3d day of January,
God bless you all.

^^*Loo. olt.
.'
——I
^^Loc. olt.
^°Ibld., 636-639.

CHAPTER VII
THE BIASED JDDOmHT

We are tailoring our defense to fit today* a
situation. We are converting fat to muscle.—
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson!

&&%&!ama m&m

mkzi naem* This

concluding statement of confidence in Louis Johnson by the
House Committee on A%%ed Services, after substituting for the
National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
pondering the Nation* e military problems, might have been
expected to irrevocably bar the Navy from further major im
portance in security osnsultations.

The half-baked design

of the Navy to take over an unwarranted share of the Nation’s
meager defense establishment had been shot full of holes, not
only by preponderant military evidence, but by the even more

pressing political necessity for short-sifted economy.
Still the door, which the Navy had feared was closing
on it for over a year, opened wide again in less than a week
after the end of the committee hearings.

Instead of approach

ing an impossible solution to the defense problems based

solely on the evidence of testimony, the committee added the
fêax-im-âlj: E s m
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element of violent pertisan emotion and aymjpathy for the
Navy oauaed by the removal of Admiral Denfield a# Chief of
Naval Operation* on 27 October 194#.

Hi* relief occurred

on Navy Day, formerly a happy naval holiday, but now of
ficially abandoned due to an earlier edict by Louie Johneon.2
% l B poorly timed action was a necessary administrative and
personnel change for the best interests of harmony, efficiency,
and sound judgment in the top military councils of the Nation,

and not a reprisal for Denfield** partisan naval testimony
before the House Committee on Armed Services.

However, obvi

ously, as in the case of the later MacArthur incident, Congress
did not unanimously support this view.
The relief of Admiral Denfield, Which included the
offer to him of any other four star billet in the Navy, re

ceived every shade of opinion in the Congress.

Representa

tive Edward Hebert, Democrat from Louisiana, indicated that
Chairman Vinson had been insulted.

Senator^ Kenne^Wherry,

Republican of Nebraska, thought the action necessary to re

store order.

Representative Paul Kilday from fesas felt the

move restored civilian control of the armed forces and
another Democrat, Representative Carl Durham of North Caro
lina, stated that the removal was justified for maintaining

cooperation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.^
In full recognition of the political significance of
2News item in Army and Navy Journal, 29 Octob er 1949*
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the ouster, the Navy was jubilant.

Crowd# of bluejackets

thronged around Louis Denfield*# home on Observatory Hill
and cried, "Denfield for P r e s i d e n t and "Hurrah for Oncle
L o u i e . Louie, in his cloak of martyrdom, was alleged to

reply:
The Navy is bigger than anything else or any
individual. The Navy will carry on and I will do
my part to help the Navy and the country. I will
step down if it will do that.5

However, the crux of this controversy between the
Executive branch and the majority of Carl Vinson* s committee
warn expressed by the opposing opinions of Johnson and the
Ceorglan.

The Secretary of Defense insisted that he had up

held the previous commitments made to Vinson about no re
prisals, but:

This is not to say, of course, that there will
not be some changes in assignments within the De
partment of Defense. Such changes will occur
continw)ualy, whenever any individuals show them
selves tollsck the qualifications for jobs to which
they have been assigned, and as other individuals
show themselves to possess the necessary qualifi
cations.*
In rebuttal, the strong man from the South replied, in part:
Admiral Denfield has been made to walk the plank
for having testified before the Armed Services Com
mittee # a t the Navy is not being consulted as to its
functions, that the Navy*# roles and missions are
being altered, that the Naval air arm is being fwced
into a state of weakness and that the Navy is not
accepted in the full partnership in the national
defense structure.

^&oC' S M *
alt'
*Ibid.. ) November 1949.

-loaThe security of the nation demands that re
sponsible military men at all times be free to
give to the Congress and the country the trw
state of affairs as they see it in the armed
services, even though their views run counter
to that of the civilian heads and in conseqwnce
of having done so there should be no reprisals.
Secretary Matthews at the very outset of the
hearing publicly stated that all naval witnesses
were free to state their views and now Admiral
Denfield is made to pay the price for having done
so.
The Congress nor the committee cannot sit
quietly by and permit reprisal against witnesses
who have testified before it.
Suffice it to say that this reprisal against
Admiral Denfield for having painted the picture
as he sees it in the Navy will be dealt with in
the committee* s report and on the floor of the
House in January.7
Vinson*s eulogy of Secretary Johnson on the conclud
ing day of the unification and strategy hearings bad become
dim indeed in the minds of a majority of the committee
members.
Coagressional quandary substituted for military
dilemma. Without proper cognizance of the restrictions of
economy, which had created all this chaos in the military
establishment, the House

krmd

Services Committee, of course,

had no better success than Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of
gtaff, or the Johnson regime, in resolving the dilemma—
strength without sacrifice.

Now, with an emotional bias

added, the confusion could be only compounded,

fruitless,

indeed, as a further effort to evaluate the position of the
Navy on defense, would be a detailed critique and analysis
7jUoc. citf.
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and strategy.

This report was finally released to the public

in early March X9$€^ less than four months before the Korean
incident provided a minor test of the defense machinery and
means so ill-provided by the Congress.

However, if allowance

is made for the bias caused by the alleged Executive affront
of the Denfield removal to the delicate sensibilities of the
Congress, the findings of the committee, as listed in the
report, do provide a useful summary and commentary on how the

vision of the previous statesmanlike military position of the
Navy had degmerated in 1949 during the naval quest for a
bigger slice of limited defense funds.
For this purpose, therefore, certain findings of the

report, applicable to the position of the Navy between World
War II and the Korean incident of 1950, have been extracted,
with further examination and comment interpolated.

Among the

coaœittee findings were, first:
In view of the terrible destructiveness of
modern weapons, the Nation can no longer afford
lackadaisical planning or complacency as to its
defenses. For an indefinite time, the Nation
must maintain sound, modern, alert defensive
forces capable of anticipating dnd dealing with
a sudden enemy attack.9
This is an adequate statement of a rather negative
end for the use of force, but nowhere in the committee report.
^Bouse 1950 Unification and Strategy Report.

Git.
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as might be ezpeeted, were the aecessary means to even this
limited e W reeommended.

Acceptanoe In advance of the re

verse cutting edge of the Hoover concept of economy had, of
course, doomed any real solution to the defense problem.
The Mavy did not at any time endanger its numerous friend

ships on Capitol Hill, by advocating more total means, and,
in 1949* advocated only more naval means.

Another committee finding was;
Intercontinental strategic bombing is not
synonymous with the Ration* s military air power.
Military air power consists of Air force, Navy,
and Marine Corps air power, and of this, strategic
bombing is but one phase. The national air power
consists of the military air power of the various
services plus commercial aviation plus the national
industrial and manpower resources pertaining to
aviation.
Navy leaders are not opposed to *strategic air
warfare" but do oppose "strategic bombing" if, by
the term "strategic bombing," is meant mass aerial
boiB^ardment of urban areas.
Difficulties between the Air force and the
naval air arm will continue because of fundamental
professioiml disagreements on the art of warfare.
Service prejudices, jealousies, and thirst for
power and recognition have had only a bare minimim
of influence on this mntroversy.lO

Originally, the Navy had made most coimendable efforts
to put air power into proper focus and perspective as part
of the total power of the Nation, in contrast to the Air
force with their vociferous protagonists of the wishful
propaganda of cheap, easy military security.

The Navy had

quite properly held that only balanced forces could apply

“ i2£- £ii-
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the proper degree of military coercion required by specific
situations I which would permit a maximum of stability in
human affairs before, during, and after the requirement for

physical restraint arose.

Nevertheless, contrary to the

committee opinion, in 1949, during an avaricious attempt to
get adequate naval means instead of adequate, or at least the

best, total means, the Navy abused its objective of balanced
forces into an unbalance requiring an unwarranted deprecia
tion of the sledge hammer of power— the atomic, biological,
and chemical air offensive.
Strangely, although the Army had quietly, and the
Karine Corps had vociferously, mentioned the ground soldier

as a part of the total fighting team of the Nation, the com
mittee, even at this late date, noted land forces only by
indirection, the citing of the doughboy* a most powerful
weapon, tactical aircraft, almost as an aside:
A closer relationship should be established be
tween Marine Corps aviators, the Army Field Forces,
and the Air Force for the development of sound close
air support tactic s and techniques. The Secretary
of Defense should require the prompt establishment
of a joint training center for this purpose.
There should be joint training activities between
tactical aircraft of the Air Force and Navy to re
solve questions of relative performance of these

aircraft.11
In this field the Navy had never let its eye off the ball,
for which the Nation can be duly fateful.
Almost forgetful of the Cedric Worth ease and
llJLoc. cit.
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obliYious of the futility is attempt lug to resolve the
numerous intangibles of opinion on the relative merit of
offensive and defensive weapons without a real enemy using
radar, antiaircraft guns, and filters with ball ammunition
instead of cameras, the committee blithely said of the

touchiest Savy-Air Force mental joust*
There is no justification whatsoever for barring
naval aviation personnel from Strategic Air Command
activities of the Air Force. This is not in the
spirit of unification, despite the provocations that
may have occurred in the past to produce this situ
ation.
There should be an augmentation of interserriee
war games to resolve such questions as the Banshee
versus the B-36 in order to eliminate or at least
reduce the tensions between the services, as wall
as contributing to their combat readiness.12
The Wavy provocation had indeed been great, but the

Air Force provocation had probably been even greater over a
longer period of time.

However, this Mart balm to the Navy

was not followed by the physical ointment of money, in spite
of the mmmittee* s tender words of sympathy:
The committee deplores the manner of cancel
lation of the construction of the aircraft carrier
H3S United States, but, because of the pressure of
other shipbuilding programs at the present time and
the existing budgetary limitations on the Navy De
partment, will withhold further action— for the
present— as regards the construction of this vessel.
The committee consider it sound policy, however, for
the Nation to follow the advice of its professional
leaders in regard to this subject in the same manner
as has been heretofore done in respect to the B-36
bomber. In the committee* s view, the Nation*s
leaders in respect to naval weapons are the leaders
1%0G. cit.
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of the Waited States Navy,13

there it was, big and bold at last, the question of
money.

Nevertheless, the oommlttee, in spite of its kind

solicitude for the Navy, had properly, for the time being,
left the Navy naked of offensive air weapons of advanced
design, whereas the Air Force did have its B-36, albeit in

small numbers.

Even the element of sympathy, leaving the

door open to the Navy in the legislative halls, brought only

words, not weapons, and the promises of corrective legisla
tion, not yet realised, to restore the ego of the naval
establishment, This further hope for the Navy, still being

pushed by Navy and Marine idolaters on Capitol Hill, was
demonstrated by*
The Joint Chiefs of Staff structure, as now
constituted, does not Insure at all times adequate
consideration for the views of all services. The
committee will sponsor legislation to require ro
tation of the position of chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff among the services after a 2-year
term, and to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a member thereof.14
On this conclusion, the committee departed from reality

with its hope that irreconcilable differences could be re
solved by four service representatives better than with three,

even with the rotating neutrality of their chairman assured.
However, no one could find fault with the following succinct
comment on post-World War ll unification progress*

13loc. cjy^.
14l o c . cit.

"All

-114#@rvlc@# have bees at fault at on# time or another in the
unification effort,

there are no unification Puritan# in

the Pentagon,
Hevertheless, the House Committee on Ar##d Services
had dona fully as well as Secretary of Defense Porrestal,

his successor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in solving the
quandary of strength without sacrifice.

With unjustified

modesty, the committee summarised the goal of defense without
citing the means necessary:
A political body cannot of itself reach, through
deliberative processes, final answers on profes
sional military questions but must depend upon and
encourage a continuation of the process of explora
tion, study, and coordination among our officers of
the several services to preserve a satisfactory
doctrine of defense, to have ready applicable plans,
and to devise units, suitably equipped, to meet the
most probable circumstances of any emergency. The
significant thing is to insure that the national
defense structure Insures adequate consideration of
all professional views, especially during these
early days of unification.**
Here again was vindication of the view, held by the
Wavy from the start of unification clamor, that the role of
the senior military specialists from each service, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, should be confined to staff planning and
recommendations, with minority views fully expressed, if the

civilian Commander in Chief, the President, and his deputy
in defense matters, the Secretary of Defense, were to use

this advice properly in preserving civilian control of the
ISloc. cit.
l% o c . cit.
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final complex dacision» required in the military ##tabll*hment.

The fact that the Armed Services Committee itself

could not provide these decisions and answers "to meet the
most probable circumstances of any emergency" certainly re
quired no apology because the best civilian and military

experts in the Defense Department had also failed due to in
superable limitations on military spending.

If the Navy,

as well as the other services, had been able to perform ade
quately the missions assigned to them under unification, the
quarrel over how bestto meet future emergencies would not
have arisen.

Only this can provide any extenuation for the

deplorable flaunting of constituted civilian authority that
the Navy demonstrated by going directly to Congress over the
heads of its civil superiors.
Two weeks after the House Committee on Aimed Services
released its findings, General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Appropriations Committee in
closed session a little more about the basic dilemma.

On

15 March 1950, in testimony defending the Fiscal Tear 1951
appropriations request of the Department of Defense for thir

teen billion dollars, the Hoover spending goal mow reached by
Secretary Johnson, Bradley hinted at the difference between
means and requirements when he noted that a thirty or forty

billion dollar defense budget would be excessive due to the
danger of spoiling the American industrial potential tbrou#

economic collapse.

However, he added that, if the United

States could spend three hundred billion dollars In winning
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World War II, he would not gag at spending on a leaser scale
in

trying to win the peace.

pleasant monetary ring.

This veiled warning had an un

Secretary Johnson was s»re musical

to the Congressional ears when he said, in |»rt, "We are
tailoring our defense to fit today* s situation.
verting fat to muscle."1?

We are con

These sinews of war, just describ

ed by Secretary of Defense Johnson in March 19)0 before the
closed Senate hearing, were exposed in the same glowing terms
under an ominous date line f w public release, 17 June 1950,
one week before the Korean Incident.
17Army-Navy

l^loc. cit.

Air Force Journal, 17 June 1950.

GHAPTBR VIII
AFTERMATH AND RETROSPECT

. . . we still have with us, in what is obviously
a very acute form, the problem of the machinery for
decision-making and for the implementation of policy
in our government* . .
Ambassad«H* George F. Kennanl
Afterlight sheds m

S12£ SliâSaü*

Shortly, these

allegedly tailored defense needs did not seem to quite fit
the American defense posture required by purportedly changing

times.

Two years after the period covered by this study, in

May 1952, Bradley testified before the same Senate Committee.

He now begged the Senate to restore the rate of spending from
forty-six billion dollars imposed by the House of Representa
tives to the fifty-two billion dollars already committed in
firm contracts and troop basis by the Department of Defense
for fiscal Tear 1953 from previously approved Congressional
appropriations.

The power of the Congressional purse over

the defense sword was still apparent, yet for some reason
the goals of each had multiplied since 1950.

Correctly, how

ever, Bradley did not attribute the need for this increased
level of preparedness to the finor diversion of Korea, which
was only directly devouring one tenth of the defense budget,
^Kennao, 94.
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but rather to palpable facts of actual and foreseeable rela
tive military power that had been obvious since September
1949» and accurately estimated before then, dependent on the
Soviet Union’s proved Initial atomic disclosure.

If Brad

ley’s facts, known In 1949»? were still correct In 1952, then
the rate of defense expenditure planned for the early period

of the Korean War and the actual rate occurring during this
war should have been approximately equal.
As before Korea, 1954 remained the approximate date
for the greatest danger of Soviet willingness to risk total
war.

Still, Bradley alleged the rate of spending to be too

low In spite of the added Incentive given American armament
by emotional disturbance over a minor Incident on the Soviet
periphery.

This affair was little more disturbing than the

older Asian Incidents of IWo-Ghlna and Malaya, or even
Greece, except that for the first time the alleged spontaneity
of indigenous uprisings was dimmed by American blood and the
more overt preplanning, training, and employment of rebels

and their volunteer supporters as regular troop units based
and formed on areas within Soviet control.

The American ex

aggeration of reality In Korea reached proper proportions
when compared to the greedy amw of the automobile, as many
discovered long before a purported Presidential blunder de
preciating the value of battlefield compared to accidental
carnage.

Both types of bloodshed were deplorable, but even

more despicable was the self-Imposition of conditions for

-119futur# sXaughter or slavery so openly extended by the United
States and the West before the Korean War.
Even after two years of corrective action spent pre
sumably In withdrawing this Invitation of weakness, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff bad to call attention
to obvious deficiencies In the sacrifice of Americans, who

were still Ignoring la 1952, as Bradley Indicated, In part,
the realities of 1949 In their forecasts for 1914, or earlier*

If you would like a relative timetable, con
sider our own atomic capabilities betwemn 1945,
w M o we held the first test explosion In the New
Mexico desert, and five years later In 1950,
With all the knowledge that she has gained,
Soviet progress should be faster than our own
progress in our first five year period,%
This dwindling ratio of American atomic superiority,
which was clearly declining from a presumed Infinity In 1949
to a ratio approaching the relative rates of production,

would soon provide only an inconsequential differential due
to greater American vulnerability in atomic targets and also
due to total destruction once accomplished not being worth
multiplying.

With even less encouragement, Bradley and other

defense officials testified in May 1952 about continuing
Soviet superiority in most other fields of post-World War II
military capabilities. Including military stockpiling and

arms production.

Even qualitative air superiority was fol

lowing the loss of quantitative supremacy.

Only in surface

fleets and their accompanying aircraft did America temporarily
^.Army-iavy-Air Force Journal. 10 May 1952.
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predominate in spite of submarine threats.%
Here, at least, was one weapon the Soviet# eould not
match as yet, in spite of previous efforts on the part of
elements within the American military establishment to rid
the Nation of one clear-cut advantage of the sea-turtle over

the land-tortoise, namely, intercontinental mobility of mass
es, which air power alone probably can never provide.

Mahan

might have died, and the similar unilateral concept of power
rewritten by Douhet might also be dead, but as Millie, their
sage destroyer implies, unitary military power may well live
forever, at least so long as there is life, and now appears
to be the one last hope of life, barring an unexpected millen
ium of reason.

In die perhaps wishful thought that some may

read the lesson, Mlllis writes:
lores wrote the lesson plain. The policy of
containment requires, for success, a military arm;
that arm must be based on ground troops, available
to mntrol the actual {rather than the future hypo
thetical} situations which Communist expansion is
constantly creating. In a context which is ^obal,
these ground troops must have the mobility which
can be conferred only by control of the sea routes;
they must also have the fullest possible support of
tactical aviation, as well as whatever assistance
may be lent, under specific cKinditiens, by longerrange, ’♦strategic’* air war. The whole must be
operated as a team, making optimum use of each
available element in accordance with the circum
stances presented. . . . In actual warfare, missions
are dictated, not by service politics, but by com
bat conditions,4

The price of containment came high and demanded a
3loc. cit.
4walter Mills, "Sea Power: Abstraction or Asset?"
fork, aprll 1951, sited in full by
tarv leview. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 1952, i.
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ready, fall tool kit from the aledge hammer of strategic air
power to the military policeman’s blackjack, just as the
Navy had originally insisted before the Nation’s overweening
emphasis on strategic air power and strength without sacri

fice had warped the naval judgment.

Bradley also fully agreed

at this late date in May 1952, when a politically tenable
position on defense by his civilian superiors now permitted
a stand for the expense of balanced forces.

In his conclud

ing remarks to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Bradley
begged again for the money to help buy back the lost years
before 1949 when Soviet ascendancy in versatile military
force had been gained:

In the realm of national security, there is
one precious commodity on sale today, especially
for the Waited States, because we have the price
to buy it* ’’time.” Next year and in succeeding
years the price will be higher and there will be
less "time” we can purchase. If we are allowed
any time for preparedness after the next two car
three years, I think we will be lucky. If we
make proper use of the time that is allowed us
to strengthen our forces, we can build a deter
rent that the Soviet Union may respect, and we
may avoid having a war at all. As an American
citisen I believe it is very foolish for us not
to make the best use of the time we have.5
Even this cheery bit of optimism was colored by a
more pessimistic current estimate that Bradley made, a perti

nent portion of which was, ”In fact, today’s estimates give
the Soviet Union a capability which she may well consider as
adequate to warrant the risk of a major aggression

M m iSMBSàf
^Loc. ci%.

10 May 1952.

now. ”6
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Brmdley did not state what the relative power position of
the United States would have been if it were not for the
Korean incentive to sacrifice, nor did he account for the
lost years before Korea.

This explanation could not be made

in good taste by an Executive spokesman as an official remark
pointing, as it must, to the collective guilt of the American
people, which General Marshall had discreetly indicated some

three years before in 1949# as the supreme deterrent to an
adequate defensive posture of the United States in peace time.
In spite of the futility of informed voices crying
from the depths of the American wilderness to place reality
above visions of noxmlcy, political and military leaders still
have responsibility for informing the led.

The Navy, however,

did not stand alone among the professional military in failing

to produce leaders with the strength of character to advocate
paying the price required for balanced forces, instead of

merely paying lip service to the price that the traffic of
public opinion would bear.

Such leaders of stature rarely

occur in a democracy, but, when they do, they should gladly

forfeit power and position in order to be heard without the
stigma of disloyalty.

The effort might be fruitless, but

nevertheless should be made.

Unfortunately, the example of

the MacArthurs, Denfields, and Crosmelins leaves little of
the heroic to emulate because these insurgents, right or
wrong, debased even the improbable validity of their posi
tions under the tawdry tarnish of disloyalty before their
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meveranGe from their mastere.
Historical lessons ignored. Politics is the art of
the possible, and political life is short, but political
leaders are in a far better position than the professional
military to be heard on defease matters, even if divergence

from public opinion brings tei^orary or permanent electoral
defeat, because their motives are not suspected of profes
sional bias and bureaucratic aggrandisement for the armed
forces.

Although the record in the Baited States after

World War II will probably hever be made so frankly and
devastatingly clear, an apparent analogy exists in British
experience, during the period of German rearmament before
World War II, of comparable trials in leading a democracy
into sacrifice.

Bnfortunately, the United States has yet to

produce an effective conscience and professionally qualified
inquisitor like Churchill and the self-damning frankness of
Baldwin, confidently arrogant with overwhelming executive
and legislative power, to bring the harsh light of day on

political realities.

An interchange between Churchill and

Baldwin on 12 November 1936, however, serves to bring the
basic dilemma of the United States after World War II into
sharper focus,

^hurchill reports himself as castigating

Baldwin in the House of Comwns, for failing to keep his
pledge, made before the general election of October 1935» to
maintain British air parity with Germany, with these ex

cerpts;

-124Tb# Qov«rnffiôïiti 6Imply cannot make up their
minds» or they cannot get the Prime Minister to
make up his mind. So they go on in strange paradox,
decided only to be undecided, resolved to be ir
resolute, adamant for drifts solid for fluidity,
all-powerful to be impotent. So we go on preparing
more months and years— precious, perhaps vital to
the greatness of Britain— for the locusts to eat.7
With frighteningly honest candor Baldwin replied in
part, with emphasis added by Churchill’s later italics:
1 would remind the House that not once but on
many occasions in speeches and in various places,
when I have been speaking and advocating as far as
I am able the democratic principle, I have stated

ttat a iQasrasi^ia i|m p a a

ipsi

dictator. I believe that to be t r u e . It has been
true in this case. lou will remember the election
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leader of a great party was not alto
gether a comfortable one. I asked myself what chance
was there— when that feeling that irais given expres
sion to in Fulham was common throughout the country—
what chance was there within the next year or two of
that feeling being so changed that the country would
give a mandate for reaxmament? Supposing I had ^ n e
to the ^untry and said that Qexmany was rearming,
and that we must rearm, does anybody think that this
specific deomieraey would have rallied to that cry at
that moment? I cannot think of anything that would
ma! miÊ
Â8 a loyal member of the Conservative party, Churchill

tried to put Baldwin’s actions into the most favorable light
possible, when viewed against the background of Socialist
opposition.

Still, Churchill could only conclude;

This was indeed appalling frankness. It carried
naked truth about his motives into indecency. That
a Prime Minister should avow that he had not done

âilàflllBS S&SEË, 215.
^Ibld.. 216.
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his duty iii regard to national safety because he
was afraid of losing the election was an incident
without parallel in our parliamentary history.
Mr. Baldwin was, of course, not moved by any ig
noble wish to remain in office. He was in fact
in 1936 earnestly desirous of retiring. His
policy was dictated by the fear that if the So
cialists came into power, e v m less would be done
than his Government Intended, All their declara
tions and votes against the defense measures are
upon the record. But this was no complete defeme,
and less than justice to the spirit of the British
people. . . .9
Never has the negative power of the opposition party

in a democracy been more clearly indicated than in this
tragedy of the 1930's portrayed by Churchill, and perhaps

this power has only been equalled by the Republican Party of
the American post-World War II period, a time even more
fraught with disaster.

Only minor transposition of appropri

ate dates, places, and names, particularly the substitution
of *economy" and “slothful ease* for the "pacifism* described,
is required above to indicate accurately the political milieu
of America in the period covered by this study.

Churchill apparently felt, at least under the British
parliamentary system with undivided concentration of both
executive and legislative responsibility, unequivocally placed
at the summit; that the leader of the party in power had a
unique duty which could not be shirked.

In contrast, the

American system with its extreme diffusion of political power

makes the responsibility of the leaders to the led less
clear-cut.

However, an excerpt from the Munich Times, which

9lbid.m 216-217,
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also caught Churchilleye in early 1936, takes a mere
charitable view of the responsibility of leaders for the
basic dilemma of a democracy in preparedness.

It would be

extremely naive to assume that Soviet intelligence has not,
with at least equal perception, identified the dileima of
the United States.

Churchill cites the German estimate of

the British, in part, as follows:

The English like a comfortable life compared
with our German standards. This does not indeed
mean that they are incapable of sustained efforts,
but they avoid them so far as they can, without
impairing their personal and national security.
They also control means and wealth idsich have en
abled them, in contrast with us, for a century or
30, to increase their capital more or less auto
matically. After the war, in which the English
after some preliminary hesitation showed certainly
an amasing energy, the British masters of the world
thought they had at last earned a little rest.
They disarmed along the whole lino— in civil life
even more than on land and sea. For the land and
air defence forces England needs above all men,
not merely m»ney, but also the lives of her eitisens for Bapire defence. Mr. Baldwin himself said
a short time ago that he had no intention of chang
ing the system of recruiting by the introduction
of conscription.
A policy which seeks to achieve success by
postponing decisions can today hardly hope to re
sist the whirlwind which is shaking Europe and in
deed the #%ole world. Few are the men who, upon
national and not upon party grounds, rage against
the spinelessness and ambiguous attitude of the
Government, ani hold them responsible for the dan
gers into which the Bapire is being driven all
unaware. The masses seem to agree with the Govern
ment that the situation will improve by marking
tiw, and that by means of small adjustments and
carefully thought-out manoeuvres the balance can
once again be rectified. But neither the power
nor the courage to use force is at hand.10
To this Churchill could only add, «All this was only too
IGlbid.. 1#6-1#7, citina Meunchener Eeituna. 16 May

1936.
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An American today can make the same etatement with

justice about the United States before Korea and perhaps
even now*
This conclusion, however, leads us again to the thesis
of collective guilt for such deliberate mischances In a
democracy, particularly In the United States, where leader
ship diffusion Is a hallowed fetish.

Illhu loot, In dis

cussing the requirements of a democracy la open participation

of its people In foreign and military affairs, Insists on
this view of collective responsibility and places a treman-

dous portlonoof the accountability on the educational system,
a system «hlch, also due to collective guilt, has palpably
failed In its mission.

As Eoot looked at the problem, some

of his conclusions were;
The controlling democracy must acquire a
knowledge of the fundamental and essential facts
and principles upon which the relations of nations
depend. Without such a knowledge there can be
no intelligent discussion and consideration of
foreign policy and diplomatic conduct. Misrepre
sentation will have a clear field and Ignorance
and error will make wild work with foreign rela
tions. This is a point to which sincere people
who are holding meetings and Issuing publications
In opposition to war In general may well direct
their attention if they wish to treat the cause
of disease rather than the effects. That way Is
to furnish the whole people, as a part of their
ordinary education, with correct Information about
their relations to other peoples, about the limita
tions upon their own rights, about their duties to
respect the rights of others, about what has hap
pened and is happening In international affairs,
and about the effects upon national life of the
things that are done or refused as between nations;
lllbld., 187.
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90 that the people themselvea will have the means
to test misinformation and appeals to prejudice
and passion based upon e r r o r . 1 2
Root, among the l#st of a waning race from an earlier era of
towering Republican statesmen, thou#t this good advice In
1922.

Standing in the afterlight, the stature of hl^ thought

becomes even more Imposing after the tarnish of years of
neglect is buffed away.
Earlier, Root had been even more foresighted in his
demand for education on a broad basis for training our youth

in all the responsibilities, duties, and privileges of free
men.

Root had positive views on complying with the second

amendment of the Constitution, ratified in 1791, which states,
"A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of

a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed.*

For carrying out this Constitutional

mandate to reduce the influence of professional military men
in political and economic affairs, Root suggested the simple
and obvious device of returning military knowledge and power
to the people— the only possible way, as the Swiss know, to
reduce the burden of standing armed forces on the tax struc

ture and on the democratic imy of life by providing an air
and ground militia ready to fight o v e r n i g h t , W i t h the
IBgiihu Root, *A Requisite for popular Diplomacy,"
Foreign Affairs. I, 15 September 1922, 4-5.
12"Report on the Army of a Neutral Country," L*Armee
Ja»
la^Nation (Belgium), January,
1951, cited by Military Review.
y 1951, 89-90/
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possible exceptions

of his

well-trained protege, Henry

Stinson, and the Wilsonian, Newton Baker, former Secretary
of War Root was the last civilian within the military estab

lishment who capably dominated his professional helpers with
out damaging the armed forces.

Therefore, witb considerable

authority Root wrote to a star-encrusted bit of brass, his

formr Chief

of Staff, the simple answer to improving further

the fine American system of public, compulsory education;

Everyone i&o is fit to be a citisen of a free
country ought to be willing to serve the country
when called upon, in accordance with his ability.
The young men who are physically fit for military
duty should hold themselves ready to fight for
their country if need be, and if they are not ready
when the need comes they will not long have any
country, and they will not deserve to have any.
The vast change in the way of carrying on war which
has occurred within a few years has created a situ
ation in which it is perfectly plain that no coun
try can be ready to defend her independence against
foreign aggression except by universal military
training and a resulting universal readiness for
military service.14
Root might have added «civil defense," but then this was 1916,
when the military choices facing the Bolted States had not so

significantly narrowed.
ominous then.

Only the Kaiser looked potentially

In 1952, Congress was still wondering if

Stalin looked ominous, while the means for a ready militia
remained shelved on Capitol Hill.
The Navy could well join in the collective guilt of
the Nation by failing to recognise adequately the significance
^

. Itailhu Boot. T&e, gi^ltasy &ad

&f

||e^qnited Stages. 487, citing letter to S. B. M. Young,
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of this early solution of the Constitution, rediscovered by
Root, to the problem of equal sacrifice in the post-World
War II period.

As a glamour service, the Navy, like the Air

Force, has been notoriously derelict in her greedy skimming
of the cream of volunteers and in a passive attitude about
the universal training required for an effective ready mili

tia and civil defense teams.
Root also deserved a Churchillian accolade for
prescience at an even earlier date, over four decades before
the naval squabbling of

1949.

Here, too, the Navy, as well

as the other components, should blush with shame on hearing
these extracts from a speech delivered in 1908%
Settle your military questions within the limits
of the military establishment. Never permit a
controversy of any description to pass beyond the
doors of the War oepartemnt. It is you udio are
brou#t together to settle military questions. The
people are generous to the army and proud of it.
Don't go to them with quarrels and expect them to
settle them. Thrash these questions out, and then
let the proper representative of the army, the
Secretary of War, go to Congress with the results.
Nevor forget your duty of coordination with the
other branches of the service— the naval, marine,
and militia. This is the time to learn to serve to
gether without friction.
Remember always that the highest duty of a soldier
is self-abnegation. Campaigns have been lost for no
other cause than the lack of that essential quality.
Keep dissension and jealousy out of the United States
Army. Officers, you have no rights to rank and posi
tion incompatible with the best interests of the
service.

Do not cease to be citizens of the United States.
The conditions of ansy life are such qs to narrow
your views. Strive to broaden your sympathies by
mingling with those outside of the service and learn
ing from them the things they can teach you. As you
are good soldiers, be good citizens. Let our army
be never one of aggression, but devoted to the
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interests of justice and peace.15
Although the Spanish and Agulnaldo might not have been in

wholehearted accord with the last statement of Root, never
theless, these views appear to have much merit in their appli*
cation to the post-World War II position of the Navy on uni
fication and strategy, if only by contrast.
In another speech, now almost a half-century old.
Root seemed to have anticipated unification in its most de
sirable form, one in which the Navy could also take much

pride due to its post-World War II efforts under Forrestal’s
tutelage.

After a most tragic display of how not to fight a

war in 189&, the Army bad finally been forced into a modicum
of unification by Root* a inauguration of an infant, and sobmiwhat powerless, general staff in 1903.

With a sad reminder

of the evils of too much compartment ali sation, but with a
realistic approach to the gradualness for which Forrestal

later fought to assure a complete appreciation of all views
among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Root joined the great com

promiser across the years in sayings
Many another officer has studied and striven
and written and appealed in vain for improvements
in the military service, and has passed away, and
he and his work have been forgotten. The helpless
ness of the single individual who seeks to improve
a system has settled into hopelessness. The wisdom
in each officer’s experience has been buried with
him. Only an institution perpetual but always
changing in its individual elements, in whic|t by
conference and discussion a concensus of matured

15lbid.. 128-129, citing address at the dedication of
the Army WarGollege, Washington, B.C., 9 November 1908,

opinioa can

be reached, can perpetmte the résulta
of lodiTlduAl effort, secure continuity of military
policy, and command for its aut^orlied, conclusive
expression of military judgment upon military ques
tions the respect and effectiveness to Wiich that
judgment is entitled.
I am sure that I apeak truly %dien I say that
Presidents and Congresses and Secretaries of War
Invariably desire such aid in the performance of
their duties, and for this I look with hope and con
fidence to the General Staff of the irmy and its
great adjunctj^^the War College, which we are now
establishing.
This hope of the father of the Army General Staff
for Ismediately salutary results seem perhaps a little pre
mature, since the staff was not completely shaken down into
an effective management instrument until the regime of

Pershing after World War I.

Staff modernisation is, of

Course, a continuing evolutionary process.

The power of the

nearly autonomous bureaus and services of the Army resisted

incursions and control by the General Staff for many years.
For those unification addicts who expected that a law today
would have already proved itself completely effective yes
terday, it might have been more reassuring if they had realiz
ed that not the least of the problems of the Departments of
Defense and Army, even now, is to curb the intransigence of
the Corps of Engineers in resisting Army, or other, control
of its civil works.

There, due to the tender nursing care

of a pork-eager Congress, the Chief of Engineers rules
^% b i d .. 126, citing address at the laying of the
cornerstone of the Army War College, 21 February 1903.
^^The beat account is Otto L. Nelson, dr.. National
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güprem#* allegedly training, but to a considerable degree
also diverting, his Corps from its prime mission of military
engineering.

Even the baleful glare of the Hoover Commission

has not cured this festering sore, among many Root started
to cure a half-century before.

Time, however, at the half-century, fifty years
after loot’s greeting at the General Staff debut, was more
at a premium, and for this reason, if for no other, violently
disturbing cataclysms of the military establish^nt should
have been avoided, even when theoretically more perfect
organisationally.

As Forrestal rightfully contended, work

ability was the watchword, with specialists operating in
their own element, as much as possible, instead of arbitrarily
subjecting themselves to the false omnipotence of ignorant
jacks of all trades.
Examination of the application of Forrestal* s con
cept for top level management facilities and staff guidance
at the stmmit of governmental power, comparable to the
British or Canadian defense cabinets, is futile on two counts,
considering the Aamrldan environment to which it was applied.
First, an incompetent President could not be converted from
a sow*8 ear to a silk purse solely by a cape of ermine, and

second, the diffusion of real political power in the United
States can only cause us to moan, with Kennan, as he surveyed
the ruins of the MacArthur debacle of 1951# that;
• « • we still have with us, In Wkat Is obviously

•134a very acute form, the problem of the machinery
for decision-aaking and for the Implementation of
policy In our government. Whatever else may be
said about these facilities to date, It can hardly
be said that they are distinguished by such things
am privacy, deliberateness, or the long-tera ap
proach. The difficulties we encounter here are so
plain to all of you at this moment that I shall not
attempt to adumbrate them. The subject of their
correction Is an extremely complex one, involving
many facets of governmental organization and method.
There are those who feel that these difficulties
can be satisfactorily disposed of within our present
constitutional framework and that they are simply a
question of proper personal leadership in government.
There are others who doubt that the problem is sol
uble without constitutional reform— reform which
would give us a parliamentary system more nearly like
that which exists in England end most other parlia
mentary countries, a system in which a government
fails if it loses the confidence of its parliament,
and in which there is opportunity to consult the
people on the great issues and at the crucial moments
and to adjust governmental responsibilities in ac
cordance with the people* s decision.
I must say that if I had any doubts before as to
whether it is this that our ooumtry requires, those
doubts have been pretty well resolved in my mind by
the events of the past weeks and months. I find it
hard to see how we can live up to our responsibili
ties as a great power unless we are able to resolve,
in a manner better than we have done recently, the
great challenges to the soundness of governmental
policy and to the claim of an administration to
*
speak for the mass of the people in foreign affairs,1®
Obviously, Kennan* s audience at the University of Chicago in
the spring of 1951 was more receptive to and informed by
these remarks than the recently returned resident of the
Waldorf Towers and his helpers from Rapid)lican ranks, who,
for selfish political gain, had been endangering the vitals
of the Ration %d.th misguided criticism of Korean military
operations and other Par East policy.
l^Kennan, 94-95•
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Evea mere dasgereue

%o the

Nation than MaeÂrthur was

hi# mentor In political opportimiam, hi# former Commander In
Chief; Hoover, who, aided by aatelllte# like Taber, Taft,
Malone, and Martin, held primary responalblllty for verifying,
within the context of collective guilt, the post-Vorld War II
shibboleth of false economy in defense.

Without a sufficiency

of the vital military tools of policy, even the beat of top
management at the summit in American foreign and military af
fairs would have failed in more effectively stablixing the
position of the United States, the West, and the »mrld after
1945.

Had it not been for this insistence that the Nation

was economically unable to provide the necessary means for
defense beyoM the fifteen billion dollar annual defense cri
terion inadvertently established by the President, but indel
ibly stamped by the Eightieth Congress and the Hoover Com
mission, the validity of the orignal naval concept of uni
fication and strategy would not have been debased in 1949 by
the tragic groveling of a Navy begging crumbs from the Con
gressional banquet table at the expense of her comrades in
arms from the other armed forces.
The spectacle of a Nation with at least three times
the productive capacity of the Soviet Union and her satellites
being outbuilt militarily was rather difficult to extenuate
on economic grounds.

The only actual answer was the American

inability to sacrifice the habits of slothful ease and mechani
cal materialism, which have become too much a way of American

•13 6»

llfe when they cloud the awareness of reality required to
place these habits in their proper perspective.

Here again

is the return to the thesis of collective guilt.

Schwartz

placed this guilt in realistic focus by citing it as a
necessary factor for comparing Soviet and American economic
power.

In 1947, Schwartz warned:

Balancing strength and weakness, it semas likely
that the Soviet Hnion is economically stronger today
than ever before in its history, having available
more developed internal resources, as well as the
wealth of much of Europe idiich lies in its sphere
of influence. Power is relative, of course, and in
the next decade or so the Soviet Union, economically,
will be weaker than the United States. Here again,
hmfsver, the extent of this weakness should not be
overestimated. To measure the relative strength of
both countries, it is inadequate to compare such
crude indices as production of particular commodi
ties. If the United States produces four or five
times as much steel as the USSR, this does not mean
that it is four or five times as strong. Much of
American production consists of consumer goods, from
automobiles and motorboats to golf clubs. Also much
of American production goes into maintenance and
repair of our vast productive plant and our great
stock of conammer durable goods. When these factors
are taken into accotmt it may be realized that the
American economic superiority is narrower than sug
gested by crude production comparisons alone, though
that superiority is substantial. In the years to
come, this mar^n of superiority will probably nar
row. 19
Unfortunately, golf clubs are not a dual purpose weapon for
both the jousts of peace and war.
Perhaps the curtain of the Nation’s collective guilt,
a wishful desire for normalcy and strength without sacrifice,
has already east enough of a concealing shadow over the more
complex implications of the naval position on unification
19Harry Schwarts, Russia* s

IStiSiX. 112-113.
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Ultimata respomslWLlity, even among the mill-

tazy of a demoeraey, will probably eontinue to be clouded by

this factor, which makes both the credit a M blame for action
and inaction difficult to analyze, assign, and award.
mval right lo Valhalla, In conclusion, however,
there is only one choice.

The criteria of physical coercion

in the m o d e m world, previously established, make balanced
forces mandatory if the delicate nuances of military power
appropriate to varying situations are to be applied.

Only

these balanced forces provide any hope for a maximum of
stability in the affairs of the United States, the West, and
the world, before, during, and after the need for physical
coercion exists.

The Havy, and the Kavy alone, among the

diverse military, economic, and political elements that make
up the total power of the Nation, insisted on all these shades
of force in being as essential to defense in the period be
tween World War II and the Korean incident.

The lustre of

the naval position was ohly sli^tly diœaed in 1949 by the
depreciation of strategic air power in favor of lesser shades
of force.

After all, only these lesser shades of force had

been required before the Korean War, and even in 1952, the
atomic, biological, and chemical air offensive remains, as
yet, an unused, but necessary, weapon for either potential
blackmail or reprisal as a deterrent to blackmail and un
controlled total aggression.

The Nation owes a debt of

gratitude to the Navy for emphasis on balanced forces,
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tailor-mad® for maximum adaptability to any given military
situation by quickly merging proper increments of power.
Korea has also pointed the way in support of the naval posi
tion.

The unanswered and dubious question is whether the

Ration will follow. Until more evidence is in, the answer
to this question is probably "No."

However, the Kavy could

be right and the Ration wrong, so perhaps the Navy can yet
join Bernard Baruch on his pedestal, purportedly glorified
by Germanic praise after World War I, where, in exclusive
Valhalla, members can point to each other in mutual admira
tion, saying, "You too know war."
Whether mortal observers will long view the denial
of reason, which both makes wars possible and their waging
Increasingly less amenable to restraint in delicately limit
ing objectives short of the crudest atomic obliteration, also
is an open question, perhaps to be answered shortly.

For

those nho find the grim suspense unpalatable and the tragic
errors of the United States and the West unbearable, a fate
ful and welcome relief is provided by considering the painful
mistakes of the last, which may yet save the Nation not only
from the machinations of the Kremlin, but from its own fat
ness and folly as well.

On this auspicious omen, wishfully

presented in dune 1952, the curtain of another election year
falls temporarily over this sombre and melancholy scene, re
vealed in all its essentials by the position of the United
States Navy on unification and strategy between World War II
and Korea.
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A fertile field indeed exists for future researchers
who might at some later and more auspicious date atten^t
definitive histories or biographies concerning the cause and
effect of detailed actions related to the post-World War II
unification and strategy squabbles. Certainly, no dearth of
materials prevails. A complete listing of published govern
ment documents relating to the subject in hand might easily
run to twice the length of this study. In addition, unpub
lished materials, such as those from closed sessions of Con
gressional committee hearings and the records and minutes
concealed in the executive departments because of arbitrary
fiat or legitimate security reasons, will later find the
light of day. A shudder passes over the novice in contem-

*141plating the many cubic feet of bibliographic cataloging
required*
Meanwhile, many of the written soureee still in
urdah are already overflowing into document storage ware*
ouses where they are brutally scrambled by untrained ar*
chivists* This tragic picture becomes even more bleak when
one realises that the incinerator is an even more accessible
and secure device for bureaucratic frustration of the his
torian. Even if the written record were kept intact, unre*
corded conferences, telephom calls, and the mystic words,
"the boss says," have already faded from historical accuracy
along with the unrecognised deviations of omission and com
mission flowing from the written and spoken word. The discs
and tapes of recorded verbal transactions, too sensitive for
later stenographic transcription, have long since been shaved
or destroyed, thus granting future mmoirs immunity from the
consequences of faulty û«mrf and rationalisation*
Political science, a misnamed art, fortunately grants
more leeway to its writers than history does to historians.
Possibly because life is short and due to a sense of duty to
their contemporaries, these political writers do not wait
until the last scrap of evidence is in, but try to use their
own best judgment in collecting, collating, analysing, and
evaluating the best available information at hand that will
still allow a timely finished product* Such has been the
case in this study.
Nevertheless, the Congressional references cited
above are believed to contain the most reliable primary evi
dence that has, or can be expected to come to light, even
for the absolute historical record, in weighing the position
of the Navy on unification and strategy between World War II
and the Korean incident. In two of these committee hearings,
particularly, the administrative cloak of darkness was com
pletely removed as an obstacle to penetration into the
innermost recesses of Individual thought and organisational
policy within the Navy Departfwnt. Even those still beholden
to executive direction were not officially under wraps. What
little, if any, guessing these witnesses attempted, as to how
best to fit into the future party line of the naval estab
lishment, was more than rectified by retired personnel,
members of civilian reserve components, and other naval en
thusiasts, all of whom were more than happy to fill any gaps
in the record through sincere collaboration with the par
ticular brand of naval thought they espoused. The united
front displayed was most remarkable. The Senate Military
Affairs Committee of 1945 and the House Armed Services Com
mittee of 1949, in the latter phase of the so-called Navy
Mutiny, successfully provided unchaperoned fcrims for this
free naval expression. The other hearings on defense organi
zation from 1946 through 1949 progressively became less
productive of actuality in reflecting the true rather than
the officially enforced naval viewpoint. The sad spectacle
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-142of am #*b*rr*###d Admiral Doofiold reluctantly repeating a
diataiteful Executive policy to the Senate Committee In 1949
on the fydlaga Bill, While General Gates, Marine Corps Com
mandant, grumbled unhappily In the background with imaccustomed leather-neck reserve, provided a marked contrast with
the testimony that the same Chief of Naval Operations was to
ive In unintentional valedictory to the House Committee a
ew weeks later during the wide-open arguments on unification
and strategy. Evidence in the other hearings after 1945 must
be treated with a more jaundiced eye and Is buttressed in
this study by personal knowledge and a discriminating use of
the lonesome and tragic views of a troubled mind, James
Porrestal*#, whose record has been considerably qualified by
censorship and editing.
For the moat part, however, all of these hearings
are naked and unadorned In comparison with the literary and
personal embellishments, not always conducive to unvarnished
truth# that the published departmental reports from the Exec
utive Branch convey during this same period in their treat
ment of naval views and later defection. Omission of these
reports has been made, therefore, largely on the grounds of
lack of credibility or because of duplication of evidence.
Similarly, House hearings and reports have been omitted,
Wills the Senate carried the ball on defense organisation,
because of the close collaboration between the respective
committee chairmen and the duplication of witnesses and evi
dence. later, in contrast, during the 1949 Mutiny, the House
Committee stole the limelight due to the intransigent sympa
thy for the NSvy by some irresponsible House whbers, largely
of Republican extraction. Also, during this period, the
Senate Committee was wrapped up in the Tydings changes of
the defense organisation, while fydings, himself, as chair
man of the coa^ttee, was more than happy to pass the respon
sibility for this investigation to the House in order to
devote more time to his vain effort to survive politically
under McCarthyism.
The last item in this section, Watson’s Chief of
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a j^vernment publication, is nevertheless a splendid defini
tive history of the command post of the irmy, with emphasis
on the Chief of Staff’s role of cooperation with the Navy and
State Departments, and also relates his duties as a princi
pal military adviser to the President and Congress during
the period between the first two World Wars. As a history,
internally prepared in the Pentagon, it has the advantage of
impressive documentation, fairly used, if the chips falling
without favor from President to office help are any indica
tion. Ho one is spared, even the grand *01d Man,” Marshall
himself, nor should they be as this book accomplishes its
objective of making the pre-World War II record clear for all
to see. The SaVy’s rightful and predominant position before
World War II is unequivocally conceded throughout the text.

-143Gomlng fro® an outside source, this book provides an un
biased insight of the Havy»s superior experience and train
ing over many years in defense leadership.
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas ), XXXI, July 1951.
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Affaire. I, September 1922.
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preeminent

gasette of the armed forces since 1863, has never let its
readers down in its precise weekly coverage of military and
foreign affairs with all their executive and legislative
domestic ramifications. Generally scooping the best dailies,
including the New York Times, because of its unbiased on-tbespot coverage tha't grants It precedence on delayed releases,
and without fear or favor, the Joynal is far superior to the
Times, impregnated as it is with Hanson Baldwin, D3NA, *24,
in unemotionally considering the events recorded in this
study, both in news items and editorially. However, only
news items have been used here to review recent and as yet
unpublished Congressional hearings, to capture some flavor
of the hectic events of 1949 and 1950, and to substitute for
a published House Committee Report, not distributed to this
location, which the Journal quoted in full,
A debt of gratitude is owed to the periodicals cited,
which along with others over the years may have contributed
to the opinions expressed in this study, but, as in the case
of remittances to Webster, all debts cannot be paid. The
specific articles are cited only as they came in hand through
recollection or emerged later in the afterlight as partiql
support of previously held views. These views, it is to be
hoped, have not unduly preconditioned honest expression of
fact and opinion.
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Churehill, Winston S., the Soeond World War. I-V, Houghton
Mifflin Company, Boston, 1948— .
Jessup, Philip C., Elihu Root. 2 vols., Dodd, Mead, and
Company, Sew York, l9io.
Kennan, George P., American ligloj^ci 1222-Ü5â» University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951.
Millis, Walter, ed., and £« S. Duffield, collaborator, The
Porrestal Diaries. Viking Press, Hew York, 1951.
Root, Blihu, m i M p aaâ S R i a a W
&he united
States. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, eds., Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1916,
Here, both for authors and subjects, words alone can
not express proper affection and respect for the sublime.
The conflict between Root and his youthful Boswell only
deepens devotion to both. By now, Jessup, in spite of
McCarthy to the contrary, is well on the way to upxoot Root.
Both of these men are products of their times, but no appar
ent irrevocable cleavage between them exists in the means
they have devoted to the national interest. Jessup’s biog
raphy of Root was indispensable in evaluating Root’s selected
papers and addresses so thou^tfully prepared as a campaign
document for him in 1916 by Bacon and Scott. The remaining
material in this section passes the critical tests of both
fore and hindsi#t and, except for the qualification on
Porrestal cited in section 1 of this Bibliography, should
be accepted as authoritative in the fields of fact and opin
ion.
4.

SPECIAL MONOGRAPHS

Husar, Ellas, The Purse and the Sword. Cornell University
Press, Ithaca, ilvfT, 1^507”*
Nelson. Otto L., iationa|.. g$curity and
General Staff,
Infantry Journal Press, Washington, D.C., 1946.
Schwara, Harry, Russia’a ffistwar Economy. Syracuse Univer
sity Press, Syracuse, N.I., 1947.
Nelson is a rather unique character in that he carried
more people on his shoulders than any other junior army
officer in the last mr and did iiànsuch a likable self-effac-
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lag way that his merit was reeognlseâ by four Distinguished
Servie* Medals and promotions from Captain to Major General
in four years. Renowned as the foremost management expert
of the Army, in spite of the kudos falling deservedly on
capable four-star McHamey, his boss, lelson at the age of
forty-four resigned his commission in 1946, overpaid his
debt to the Ration by bringing his Harvard doctoral disserta
tion up to date in the book cited above, and is now making
quite a comfortable living as Vice President of the New York
Life Insurance Company# He risked the rigors of civilian
life anwd only wità a Major’s retirement pay, but, in less
than two years, fluidity in retirement laws jimped him again
to the grade of Major General without the onus of remounting
the promotion ladder rung by rung. Unfortunately^ his book,
after laboriously following Root’s General Staff concept
through over forty years of painfhl trial and error for the
Army, jumps to the conclusion that an identical system can
be raœaed down the Nation’s throat overnight as a means of
integrating all the armed forces. The book in its entirety,
however, is the strongest possible supporting evidence for
the Navy’s recomaendations on evolutionary development in
defense organisation.
Husar demonstrates considerable knowledge of the
relations of the armed forces and the Bureau of the Budget
with Congress* Also, his book provides useful background
material for judiciously analysing the motivations of Con
gressmen, who, from the nature of the electoral process,
place constituents, district, state, and perhaps party, es
pecially if in a minority, above the needs of the Nation.
Despite numerous examples confirming this thesis, Husar fails
to recognise this basic premise and aim ignores the funda
mental Constitutional defect of authority ^thout responsibil
ity given to Congress while the Executive suffers responsi
bility without authority, a fundamental management defect
that only a parliamentary system can cure. Nevertheless,
this scholarly piece of work by a former Bureau of the Budget
employee, dwelling in his iVory tower at Cornell, shows
sublime <H»nfidence that the Bureau of the Budget and Congress
are perfectly capable of running the defences of the Nation
without adequate professional advice. One reviewer intimates
that his chortle of joy over the hamstringing of Tommy Atkins,
Davey Jones, and the wild-blue-yonder boys changed to a
death-rattle, possibly induced by the shock of Korea. Husar*s
dubious nugget was suggested as a reference by the Director
of the Budget. The book proved a poor consolation prize in
return for valiant, but fruitless, efforts to penetrate the
curtain still hanging over the documented Executive portion
of the melancholy scene herewith described.
Sehwars provides an early and realistic estimate of
Soviet recovery potential from the aftermath of war. De
scribed somewhat vaguely as a post-doctoral fellowship
project, his independent study of the few open Soviet sources
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available gala* statura by coming to the same ooncluaion# as
the Army General Staff did during the same period with the
aid of British covert sources. Only one obvious finding is
considered indisputable, namely, that golf clubs, yearly
Cadillacs, and other conspicuous civilian consumption, wimn
subtracted from fantastic American production indices rela
tive to those of the Soviet orbit, reduce the apparent
superior economic power of the Bnited States as a usable
instrument of policy in terms of immediate military effec
tiveness.

